Sexuality and Politics:
Regional Dialogues from the Global South

Editors: Sonia Corrêa, Rafael de la Dehesa, Richard Parker
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Between March 2009 and October 2010, Sexuality Policy Watch (SPW) organized a series of three regional Dialogues on Sexuality and Geopolitics in Asia (Hanoi, March 2009), Latin America (Rio de Janeiro, August 2009) and Africa (Lagos, October 2010). These were followed by an Interregional Dialogue that brought together participants from the previous events (Rio de Janeiro, September 2011). The Dialogues were intended as a space to share knowledge, analyses and research findings. They followed a global research project, carried out from 2004 to 2007, that resulted in *SexPolitics: Reports from the Frontlines* (Parker, Petchesky & Sember, 2007)\(^1\), and that explored the dynamics of sexual politics in specific countries and global institutions through individual case studies. Our hope was that the Dialogues would build on this earlier project by breaking through the boundaries of the nation-state in ways that could shed light on transnational forces at work in sexual politics, particularly in the global South.

These Dialogues were not designed as a conventional research project, but rather as an opportunity to enhance collective processes of reflection on sexuality and politics, bringing together academics and activists engaged in various areas of sexuality research and advocacy. The central premise informing the exercise is that sexuality is always related to power. Based on this premise, the proposal was that the Dialogues would look into four areas of intersection: (1) sexuality and the

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\(^1\) Available at [http://www.sxpolitics.org/frontlines/home/index.php](http://www.sxpolitics.org/frontlines/home/index.php)
state/political processes, (2) sexuality and religion, (3) sexuality and science and (4) sexuality and economics. That said, the meetings were organized in close discussion and partnership with SPW collaborators and colleagues in the regions, who participated in regional taskforces and ultimately defined the meetings’ composition and agenda. These regional taskforces adapted this overarching framework, with its four axes of discussion, in ways that reflected conditions prevailing in sexuality research and politics in each context, perceptions in relation to priorities and relevance, the availability of pre-existing research and analysis that contributed to the Dialogues, as well as the composition and profile of participants at the meetings and of the taskforces that organized them. This adjustable model inevitably produced refractions in terms of how the original framework was addressed and altered in each region.

The results of the Dialogues are included in the two-volume publication *Sexuality and Politics: Dialogues from the Global South*. The first, companion volume to this one includes a selection of six papers presented at the regional Dialogues, which reflect some of the major dilemmas and themes raised at each meeting. This second volume draws on all the papers presented and the larger discussions in the dialogue series in order to present a broader summary and synthesis of the discussions and debates that took place. We attempt to engage the totality of material processed in the course of these four meetings, also situating these in relation to theories and analyses available in the literature on the intersections examined between sexuality, the state and politics, religion, science and economics. The content presented here to the readers can be understood as a meta-analysis that combines the wealth of the knowledge and information shared in the Dialogues with the views and insights of many other thinkers and researchers, as well as with our own visions in regard to these four domains.

We are grateful to all participants of the three Dialogues who contributed to these discussions by sharing their ideas and experiences. In particular we want to express our deep gratitude to Rafael de la Dehesa, as without his knowledge and patience these publications would not be
possible, and also to Rosalind Petchesky for offering her wisdom and editing skills to enrich and refine the ideas we had developed in this exercise. We also thank the Ford Foundation for having supported this project, in particular, Barbara Klugman who was the Program Officer for Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights when this cycle of debates took place. Most especially, we would like to recognize Gabriela Leite, the longtime activist and leader of the sex worker movement in Brazil, who participated in the Latin America Dialogue and who collaborated closely with us in SPW and at the Brazilian Interdisciplinary AIDS Association (ABIA) prior to her untimely death just before we finalized this text. Her courage and solidarity were an inspiration to us, and her thoughts and influence are present throughout these pages.

It is our expectation that these twin volumes will contribute to the continuing interrogations on the connections between sexuality theorizing and research and political change, highlighting blind spots and pitfalls but also breakthroughs and gains, however limited and provisional they may be.

Sonia Corrêa, Rafael de la Dehesa and Richard Parker
Rio de Janeiro, July 2014
States and Sexual Politics

There is, to begin with, a geopolitical understanding underlying the idea of a South–South dialogue that is central to this entire project and that needs to be unpacked. It is premised on the notion that despite vast differences within and across Asia, Africa, and Latin America, there are certain shared elements, rooted in these regions’ historic insertion in the global economy and experiences of colonial, semicolonial, and postcolonial subordination; that their violent confrontation with various global projects of modernization (liberal, socialist, developmentalist, neoliberal, and so on) has given rise to economic, political and cultural dynamics that are also loosely shared, if instantiated in very different ways. The dialogues on sexuality and geopolitics, then, began with the premise that these multiple strands of globalization are also intimate, embodied, and thus inflected by gender and sexuality. Moreover, otherwise diverse southern regions share a historical legacy in which processes of state formation, closely bound with histories of empire, have been constitutive of and constituted by constructions of sex–gender and racial orders (Connell, 1987; Omi & Winant, 1994). Contemporary sexual politics inevitably bears the mark of this shared history.

One set of traces and experiences loosely shared across societies in the “global South” involves a certain shallowness of the political public sphere and blatant gaps between laws and public policies on paper and their implementation in daily life. The experience of global South societies and states raises important questions about transnational models and prescriptions that have been advanced with regard to democracy, human rights and even sexual and reproductive rights. Social, ethnic and racial stratifications are undoubtedly key features of the contemporary landscape in both the South and the North. Nonetheless, in the case of southern countries these stratifications usually overlap with postcolonial remnants that make them acute and resilient in ways that are quite often distinct from those in the global North societies, where ethnic and racial tensions have also scaled up in the last decade, for example, in debates about immigration and anti-terrorism. With respect to
cultures, and within them sexual cultures, South-to-South conversations cannot avoid addressing the complex of cultural meanings, practices and identities that is reconfiguring both transnational and local practices, and that is key to grasping more fully how gender and sexuality systems are both structured and in rapid flux (García Canclini, 1995; García Canclini et al 1993).

All of this said, it is important to avoid the reification of categories. “What is Asia?” was the first question raised at the Asian Regional Dialogue, and the tendency of geopolitical categories, including regional and national identities, to erase internal heterogeneity (and inequality) was a recurring theme throughout the dialogues. Similarly, the expression “global South” is metaphoric. Used to denote nations historically subordinated by colonial expansion, it lumps together an enormous array of places and life-worlds under a single problematic rubric. Above all, it is important to recognize this heterogeneity and to contextualize Western imperialism within longer arcs of history. While scholars generally agree that an integrated global capitalist economy emerged through European conquests beginning in the fifteenth century, the scale and importance of earlier “world systems” should not be minimized. As early as the thirteenth century, interlocking networks of trade connected vast territories, from Venice and the Italian city-states, into eastern Africa and through Central Asia, stretching past the Arabian peninsula and the Indian subcontinent to encompass China and the Pacific islands off its coast, with important political and economic centers in China, India, and the Islamic Empire (Abu-Lughod, 1987–1988; Braudel, 1984; Arrighi, Ahmad & Shih, 1996; Hobson, 2009). Across the ocean, the Aztec and Inca empires connected vast systems of trade, stretching, respectively, from present-day Central America to the Southwestern United States, and from Colombia to Northern Chile and Argentina (Mignolo, 2000).

To suggest that the countries now occupying these territories can be solely understood in terms of a shared history of European colonization would be clearly reductive and would risk reinscribing problematic portrayals of these regions as merely consumers, not producers, of global history. Moreover, colonial and postcolonial experiences are themselves heterogeneous. Can the semicolonial
status of nineteenth-century China be compared to the experience of direct colonial administration of Indochina? Postcoloniality in Mexico, after two centuries of formal independence, is quite different from the postcolonial conditions in Ghana or India (McClintock, 1995). Finally, the terminology of global South and North should not be used to suggest fixed or stable regional characteristics or to invoke old dichotomies between development and underdevelopment. Without drawing equivalencies in material conditions, it is nonetheless true that growing economic polarization in both North and South, increased international migration, and the greater economic weight of the so-called BRICS (i.e., Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) are intensifying the development of a south in the north and a north in the south, “rendering both sites of growing contradictions” (Dirlik, 2007, p. 15).

With all these caveats in mind, participants at the dialogues addressed a variety of themes related to sexual rights advocates’ relationship with the state, political societies, other social movements, and international actors, underscoring both differences and shared challenges across and within regions that, inevitably, were only partially “represented”. Here, we present some of the principal threads of discussion. We begin by turning briefly to the reverberations of colonial legacies and processes of postcolonial state formation in contemporary sexual politics, underscoring the imbrication of historic constructions of sex–gender orders with various projects of modernization. We follow by considering the consequences of the recent turn to formally democratic regimes in many countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, assessing the promises and pitfalls opened by the language of sexual, reproductive, and human rights in contemporary political debates. We then turn to the changing contours of governmentality in the contemporary context of globalization and their implications for activism.

**Historical excursions (with a view to the present)**

A growing body of research has underscored the entanglement of constructions of gender and sexuality with the histories of colonialism (Chatterjee, 1989; Epprecht, 2004; Phillips, 2011; Sadock,
2013; Stoler, 1995, 1997; Stoler & Cooper, 1997). For imperial powers, the colonies became a projection screen for pornographic fantasies of racialized desires and anxieties, constitutive of metropolitan identities and self-understandings (McClintock, 1995). Iberian colonizers imagined the Native Americans they encountered as noble savages, innocent of sin, like Adam and Eve before the Fall. French colonial observers in Indochina projected Orientalist visions of gender inversion, describing a world of effeminate men and hypersexualized women (Proschan, 2002; Said, 1978).

In her paper presented at the African Dialogue (included in Volume I), Sylvia Tamale observed: “The bodies of African women especially worked to buttress and apologize for the colonial project.” Depicted as “insatiable, amoral, and barbaric beings” and “the antithesis of European mores of sex and beauty,” such representations became key tropes in narratives of barbarism and civilization, the ideological scaffolding of empire, “fundamental to the consolidation of imperialism”. These images and anxieties informed political practices, reflecting a particular concern over the possibility of sexual intermingling between colonizers and colonized, the violent intimacies of empire, and the threat to boundaries posed by miscegenation and racialized children (Stoler, 1997). Colonial policies regulating religious expression, marriage and kinship, sexual relations, urbanism, hygiene, and public health, while routinely confronted with everyday practices of resistance, negotiation, and reinterpretation, nonetheless shaped the bodies, sexual practices and understandings of gender of both colonizers and colonized. In short, in many dimensions of life affected by colonialism, sexuality and gender constituted central axes for the exercise of imperial authority, critical to the maintenance of racial boundaries and the larger colonial order (Stoler, 1989).

The imperial project in the Americas that dominated the first era of European imperial expansion was a joint enterprise between Iberian monarchies and the Catholic Church. Both saw it as a continuation of religious wars against the Islamic presence on the Iberian Peninsula, and the Vatican granted monarchs, as representatives of Christendom, considerable authority over Church affairs (Casanova, 1994). As missionary colonizers, Iberians had ambitions that went beyond economic exploitation and military control, entailing efforts to “colonize the imagination” and the life worlds of
indigenous communities, including understandings of sex, reproduction, and the family (Gruzinski, 2004). In their missionary fervor, colonial authorities imposed and adapted various ideologies and administrative techniques imported from Europe, including the Canonical regulation of marriage, the practice of confession, and legal proscriptions equating sodomy with treason, punishable by death (Gruzinski, 1989; Lavrin, 1989; Mott, 1988; Figari, 2007). The principle of honor rationalized the colonial order, targeting women’s sexuality for particular control with tight prescriptions around compulsory virginity and marital chastity. Supporting elite claims to social status, that principle drew distinctions based on race, virtue, “legitimate” birth, and social class, with profound implications for people’s life chances (Twinam, 1989).

Such techniques of government were generally not directly transposed from the metropole but rather altered and adapted to the perceived imperatives of colonial rule. The notion of *limpieza de sangre* (purity of blood), associated with the principle of honor, for instance, had originally been deployed to police the boundaries of Christendom on the Iberian Peninsula, against Jews, Muslims, and recent converts to Christianity (Martínez, 2004). In New Spain and Brazil, it was elaborated through theories that contemplated the possibility of redeeming Indian but not African blood through miscegenation, thus biologizing early notions of race in ways mediated by sexed and gendered ideologies to rationalize the use of African slave labor (Martínez, 2004). Needless to say, such rules were routinely skirted, resisted, and contested, as evidenced by Church documents lamenting Native Americans’ disregard for the confession, by syncretized religious practices that loosely grafted Catholic precepts onto African and Native American beliefs and worldviews, and by ecclesiastical records of trials for witchcraft, sodomy, and adultery suggesting that counter-hegemonic sexual practices were not uncommon. Such expressions speak to the practical limitations

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2 It is worth noting, however, that at least in the case of Brazil, Jewish “blood” was systematically screened as a parameter to allow Portuguese colonizers to attain higher ranks in the administration or even to be granted aristocratic status by the Crown. This concern resulted from the high number of converted Jews (marranos or New Christians) sent to Brazil in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (Cabral de Mello, 2009).
of colonial government and the relatively shallow penetration of the Church’s civilizing mission, particularly evident in Brazil, where the Portuguese maintained the characteristics of a mercantile extractive empire much longer and where the Church’s institutional presence was comparatively weak (Casanova, 1994).

As the imperial enterprise deepened and expanded into other regions of the world, Europe itself went through sequential waves of political and civil strife, inherent in the consolidation of the new capitalist order. In the course of this history, absolutist states expropriated power from smaller political units and looser structures of government (e.g. feudal kingdoms), eventually contributing to the emergence of large-scale bureaucracies capable of subordinating sovereign authority to abstract rules of conduct and establishing a governmental presence within clearly-demarcated territorial boundaries. This process thus gave rise to what classical accounts of state-formation posit as the central hallmarks of the modern state (Weber, 1958, 1978). It is important to consider in this context the insights of revisionist histories, which have sought to situate such accounts in the context of larger global currents. Where classic accounts regard the emergence of modern nation-states as largely endogenous to Europe and later bestowed on the world through imperial benevolence (Tilly & Blockmans, 1994; Anderson, 1991), recent critiques have emphasized both Afro-Asian contributions to state development (Hobson, 2009) and the “boomerang effect” of colonial practices, repatriated from the colonies and incorporated into the “juridico-legal structures of the West” (Branch, 2010; Foucault, 2003, 2007; Jung, 2008; Silverblatt, 2004).

In the course of these developments, two principles of delimitation of sovereign power began to take shape in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (Foucault, 2008). One involved the development of a new liberal form of polity that conceived state–society relations in terms of a social contract. According to the social contract fiction, free men in a state of nature abdicate their liberty in exchange for protection by the newly constituted sovereign state, thereby becoming free citizens who can claim rights against it and hold it to account. Premised on the androcentric
notion of transcendent “man” that grounds Western humanism, social contract theory demarcated political boundaries between citizens (European men, owners of property, who as participants in the contract could claim such rights) and non-citizens (who, remaining outside the contract, had no such recourse). It also drew boundaries between a public realm grounded in the principles of equality among free citizens and a private realm that, while establishing limits on sovereign authority in matters like religious expression and individual conscience (thus instituting the principle of secularism, or laïcité), also preserved and naturalized established hierarchies of race, gender, and social class, thus articulating two parallel and contradictory logics of power (Pateman, 1988).

The second delimitation of sovereign power was demarcated by utilitarian precepts and technical rationalities, drawing boundaries between things that fell within the competence of sovereign authority and things that did not (e.g., the “invisible hand” of the market). Michel Foucault (1991, 2003, 2007, 2008) identifies this transformation with the emergence of governmentality, a new mode of governance that, without displacing the sovereign power to command and take life, would eventually come to dominate it. Governmentality broadly refers to political rationalities and institutional techniques designed to manage individual and collective conduct toward the realization of some notion of collective wellbeing. Foucault associates its emergence with the historic development of biopower, a modern rationality of governance that, with population as its object, brought the life processes of populations (fertility, mortality, morbidity, etc.) under the purview of rationalized administration. Governmentality thus progressively articulated the administrative apparatuses of modern bureaucratic states with emerging systems of knowledge, such as criminology, pedagogy, anthropology, demography, urbanism, public health and social welfare. While inscribing areas of civil society beyond the competence of sovereign authority, then, this transformation simultaneously facilitated an enormous expansion of governmental power through capillary techniques of management that would come to envelop more (and more intimate) spheres of life within its domain.

Both transformations would have profound effects not only on European states but also on the
structure and ideological underpinnings of late colonial relations. The abstract foundational principles of equality and self-rule underlying the social contract immediately generated rights claims, conflicts, and political struggles around the redistribution of resources and questions of political inclusion and representation, raising the central and still unresolved question of who is or is not included in the social contract and under what terms. The contradictions inherent in the division between public and private would inspire early Marxist and feminist challenges to liberal doctrines as well as antislavery and anticolonial resistance. As the political theorist Uday Mehta (1997) has argued, such liberal principles presupposed and only partially obscured strategies of political exclusion based on racist notions of civilizational backwardness and inscrutability, rationalizing their coexistence with continued imperial domination. The promises of democracy, citizenship, and popular sovereignty were thus folded into evolving Eurocentric notions of a universal modernity and the pedagogic missions advanced by late imperial powers. At best, they were held out as future possibilities for colonized people, provided the alleged pathologies of native cultures could be overcome, key among them the allegedly backward treatment of women and purportedly aberrant sexual practices that so obsessed imperial powers (Chatterjee, 1989, 1993; Sen, 2002). At the same time, the proliferation of biopolitical technologies of governmentality contributed to a hardening of state racism. Justifications for conquest came to be grounded in the precepts of scientific racism, presupposing essential and absolute difference, as categories of race, tribe, religion and caste became increasingly sedimented through their institutionalization in technologies of colonial rule (Foucault, 2003; Stoler, 1995; Dirks, 2001). These histories and the extensive academic literature that has explored them over the past two decades provided an important backdrop for discussions at the dialogues. They helped to highlight the ways in which sharply contrasting constructions of sexuality have been articulated with various “modernizing” projects that have been both imposed on and pursued by actors in the global South, as we elaborate in the following sections.
Postcoloniality and the dilemmas of modernization

In their presentation at the Latin American meeting (included in Volume I), Mario Pecheny and Rafael de la Dehesa took up the central theme of universalist constructions of modernity, tracing Latin American elites’ historical inscription of gender and sexuality within larger modernizing projects, “both liberatory and repressive”. As the authors observed, the Latin American republics that emerged from the wars of independence of the nineteenth century, without exception claiming modern liberalism as a foundational tradition inherited societies that were deeply stratified by race, gender and social class (Avritzer, 2002, Martin Barbero, 2003). Fundamentally Eurocentric in their outlook, new national elites advanced liberal and secularizing reforms informed by European experiences over the course of the nineteenth century, with complex and sometimes contradictory effects on gender and sexual relations and distinct implications for different sectors of society. For example, beginning with the Brazilian penal code of 1830, sodomy was decriminalized in most countries in the region, reflecting the influence of the French Napoleonic Code. However, laws regulating morals and good customs, corruption of minors, assaults on public decency, and vagrancy permitted continued repression to uphold prevailing orders of sex, gender, race, and social class. Restrictive laws on abortion, which were not part of colonial criminal prescriptions or even canonical rules, would be included in post-independence criminal justice codifications and would remain on the books far into the twentieth century; in many cases these anti-abortion laws are still applicable today.³

Secular reform movements were stymied not only by political elites’ vested interests in preserving (indeed, deepening) social hierarchies but also by the limits of state capacity. Moreover, potential

³ The reason why colonial criminal law and canonical norms did not include a prohibition on abortion must be understood as an effect of the longstanding Catholic theological debates around the status of the fetus as a person, which, significantly enough, had to wait until the late nineteenth century to be resolved (Rosado Nunes, 2012). Only then were secular biopolitical structures of governmentality condemning abortion fully established.
reforms emanating from a dominant political culture with intellectual attachments to liberal precepts collided with broad-based clientelistic practices that relied on the patrimonial power of local political bosses. As Pecheny and de la Dehesa (2013) noted, elite reliance on the perceived “patriarchal stability” represented by local landholding families delayed reforms of family law in many countries until well after independence (Deere & León, 2005; Dore, 2000). More generally, informed by theories of scientific racism and fears of national degeneration, liberal and subsequently, positivist elites would “prioritize [conservative] modernizing projects over individual liberties and egalitarian ideals, establishing highly exclusionary oligarchic republics”. This is the backdrop, Pecheny and de la Dehesa contend, against which one should understand elite efforts to whiten national populations by attracting European immigrants and the forced removal of indigenous communities through measures ranging from campaigns of genocide in the Southern Cone to the privatization of communal lands in Mexico. Early efforts to regulate prostitution and control venereal disease, which spread throughout the region in the nineteenth century, were also articulated with larger political projects seeking to promote civilization, order, and progress. The imbrication of constructions of gender and sexuality with modernizing projects has continued to the present day. As the authors observe:

The advocates of eugenic policies in the early twentieth century who promoted prenuptial certificates with the goal of ensuring national development and “racial health”; the Marxist militants of the 1960s and 1970s who dismissed homosexuality as a form of bourgeois deviance to be superseded on the revolutionary path to socialism; and contemporary political actors positing the legal recognition of sexual rights as a symbol marker of so-called modern states, all in one way or another inscribe sexualities into a binary of past and present, informed by a universal telos … (Pecheny de la Dehesa, 2013, p. 110)

The point, they note, is not to draw ethical equivalencies among these projects. Rather, it is merely to underscore how the governance of desire continues to be mapped onto larger ideologies of economic and political development in ways that at least raise questions about who has access to
the products and practices said to be ‘modern’ and about what gets constructed as a past to be overcome.

Many of these themes emerged in distinct but parallel ways at the African Regional Dialogue, where the question of colonial legacies received the most attention. It was raised in relation to the relative weakness of many contemporary African states given the current asymmetries of the global system, themselves in good measure a colonial legacy. The issue of colonial legacies also came up in relation to the common framing of contemporary debates around sexual rights on the continent in ways that invoke the defense of African tradition against neocolonial pressures. In her paper presented at the dialogue, published in the first volume of this publication, Sylvia Tamale (Tamale, 2013) also highlights the scientific underpinnings of imperial projects, beginning with a critical interrogation of the power dynamics shaping colonial (and postcolonial) research on sexualities:

Nowhere were assumptions regarding the ‘knower’, the ‘known’ and the ‘knowable’ taken more for granted than in sexuality research conducted on colonized populations such as those found in Africa … Generally speaking, research in the colonial context was conducted along a traditional hierarchy of power between the researcher and the researched. It was almost always assumed that the researchers were all-knowing individuals and the researched, naive “subjects”. It was further presumed that only the former could create legitimate, scholarly knowledge, usually through written reports and publications, with little or no acknowledgement of the role the researched played in the process. (Tamale, 2013, p. 19)

Indeed, technological innovations and the sciences became foundational tenets in the ideologies of racial superiority and civilizing projects used to justify imperial expansion (Keller, 2001; and Section III below. As Tamale traces in the same essay the colonial production of knowledge about African sexualities, often financed by colonial governments or mercantile enterprises, from the racist reports
by early colonial white missionaries and explorers to the ethnographic and public health studies of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. These studies, she notes, played a key role in the dissemination of racist stereotypes about African sexualities, including assertions about Africans’ purported lasciviousness and promiscuity and myths that African women menstruated in greater quantity or could give birth without pain. Colonial research in public health, she notes, focused narrowly on questions like containing venereal diseases and curbing perceived sexual perversions (see also Walther, 2008).

Contemporaneous with similar efforts in Asia and the Americas as well as Europe, the regulation of sex work became a key site of public health interventions, regarded by colonial officials as necessary to sustain their military and administrative presence. Indeed, comprising an early expression of global regimes to control sexualities, legal frameworks regulating brothels, mandating the registration and periodical medical examination of sex workers, and confinement of those found infected were adopted in Russia in 1843, Italy in 1860, Great Britain in 1864, Japan in 1871, and Argentina in 1875, among many other states. In 1867, the International Medical Congress in Brussels voted to form a commission to share Belgium’s model of regulation with other governments (Limoncelli, 2006a). In the colonies, the French, who had originally instituted this model alongside Napoleon’s expanding armies, established elaborately racialized regulatory systems designed to ensure that men from the metropolis and the colonies had access to their “own” sex workers, even selling bonds to raise money for brothels in Morocco (Limoncelli, 2006b). In the British colonies, ordinances similar though wider in scope than Britain’s domestic Contagious Diseases Acts began to be instituted from the 1860s, again operating with a narrow focus on controlling the sexuality of sex workers, with little interest in their male clients (Levine, 1996; Phillips, 2002; Sadock, 2013). Notably, Tamale highlights continuities between the focus, purpose, and power relations underlying public health research on sexualities in the colonies and postcolonial knowledge production regarding reproductive health and HIV/AIDS (see below).
The medical and social sciences were thus incorporated into colonial technologies of governmentality and later institutionalized and deployed to administer behavior, not only in Africa but elsewhere. Timothy Mitchell (1991a) describes the concomitant emergence of a new object of knowledge and instrument of control in late nineteenth-century colonial Egypt: “The Egyptian character — a notion later replaced with terms such as culture — was to be carefully examined, for a disciplinary politics was predicated upon this object. Such examination was itself part of the disciplinary mechanism that places under surveillance and continually watches” (p. 104). Citing an inspector general of Egyptian schools, Mitchell discusses how the social sciences were mobilized to inculcate European civilization, on the understanding that the first task of government was “to make an account of all the defects of the popular character [the work of ethnography] … to look for their origin [the work of history], and to bring about their cure by means contrary to those which have caused them” (quoted in Mitchell, 1991a, p. 105).

Likewise, Nicholas Dirks (2001) describes the gradual development of an “ethnographic state” in colonial India that proceeded through the “anthropologization of colonial knowledge”. Dirks notes a change in colonial reports toward the late nineteenth century, as authors “began to compile ethnographic facts systematically, as if they were administrative necessities rather than antiquarian artifacts” (p. 150). While the technologies of colonial rule were infused with the racist, sexist, and heterosexist assumptions of global currents such as scientific racism, criminal anthropology, and eugenics, it is worth underscoring the independent effects of the transformation of colonial taxonomies, whatever their content, into institutional practices, which went hand in hand with a transition in statecraft writ large. Discussing the same transformations that Foucault identifies with governmentality, James Scott (1998) argues that the “heroic and greatly schematized process of abstraction and simplification” (p. 22) that permitted the intensification of governmental power implied a new way of seeing the social world to make it legible for the purposes of administration:

Most obviously, state simplifications are observations of only those aspects of social life
that are of official interest. They are *interested*, utilitarian facts. Second, they are also nearly always written (verbal or numerical) *documentary* facts. Third, they are typically *static* facts. Fourth, most stylized state facts are also *aggregate* facts … Finally, for most purposes, state officials need to group citizens in ways that permit them to make a collective assessment. Facts that can be aggregated and presented as averages or distributions must therefore be *standardized* facts (James Scott, 1998, p. 80, emphasis in the original).

The symbolic violence, practical limitations, and concrete failures of this broader transformation in statecraft continue to haunt contemporary sexual politics in various ways, lying at the heart, for instance, of many critiques of contemporary identity politics. In the context of a historical analysis, however, they are worth highlighting as they point to another transformation in colonial rule associated with the turn to anthropology, the reverberations of which also elicited discussion at the African Regional Dialogue: the institutionalization of notions of African “tradition” or “culture” that accompanied colonial governments’ growing reliance on tactics of indirect rule (Chanock, 1989). Mahmood Mamdani (2007) has underscored a shift in British colonial policy following the Indian Mutiny of 1857, with Queen Victoria’s proclamation of a “secular colonialism”, whereby the empire would not interfere in the domain of religion. The move gave further impetus to a process already underway in Africa, beginning in the British colony of Natal (part of present-day South Africa), that invested traditional chieftaincies with considerable authority within newly fixed territorial boundaries that came to be governed under customary law (Mamdani, 1996).

The growing reliance on indirect rule, as Mamdani explains, responded to the imperatives of government as understood by the British, given the limitations not only of the small numbers of European administrators stationed in the colonies but more importantly of an assimilationist colonial project. That project was based on alliances with “the educated strata of Africans, those who aspired to self-administration and independence” and were “the most pro-Western of any group”. With the shift to indirect rule, colonial administrators turned to local allies with greater cultural legitimacy
The new policy entailed a simplification of the much more complex realities of ethnic and familial identifications that existed prior to the colonial order and their institutionalization as stable, discrete, and unitary identity categories: “The more custom was enforced, the more the tribe was restructured and conserved as a more or less self-contained unit” (p. 51).

Under the new policy, chiefs were granted extensive executive, legislative, judicial, and administrative powers, as a territorialized legal distinction was created between races and tribes, the former governed under civil law and the latter under customary law. British colonial rule treated Islamic law in some territories as another variant of customary law and in others as a separate system, alongside the civil and customary regimes (Jeppie, Moosa, & Roberts, 2010). The delegation of authority across legal systems varied, for example, in jurisdiction over criminal law, although family or “personal status” law was systematically delegated across these regimes, mapping onto European divisions between public and private realms (Hashim, 2010; Jeppie, Moosa, & Roberts, 2010; Chanock, 2000). A new and complementary division thus emerged between direct and indirect colonial rule that loosely mapped onto the territorial imperatives of urban and rural governance. Civil power spoke the language of law but was subject to oversight by a civil society that was highly exclusionary and demarcated by racial boundaries, “while customary power pledged to enforce tradition”. Caught in a juridical limbo were “urban-based natives, mainly middle- and working-class persons”, who were often not subject to customary law or recognized as rights-bearing citizens or members of civil society (Mamdani, 1996, pp. 18–19). Following World War I, the French, the Portuguese, and the Belgians followed the British example, instituting policies of indirect rule in their colonial possessions (Mamdani, 1996, pp. 82–87).

It is worth noting that colonial rebellions and colonial powers’ reactions to them often intersected with discourses and norms related to gender and sexuality. This is sharply illustrated in the literary accounts and official reports of the same 1857 Great Rebellion in India that repeatedly mention the rape and mutilation of white women, even though no official records of rapes have ever been
found (Metcalf, 1964). Even more relevant is the fact that right after the rebellion, in 1861, the British Empire adopted a Penal Code whose reform included a number of relevant definitions in relation to sexuality, such as age of consent and the criminalization of “unnatural” sexual acts between males under article 377 (Agnes, 2011; Kirby, 2011; Ramasubban, 2007). The Penal Code was synchronically applied in Britain and India and rapidly transported to other colonies, strongly indicating that the regulation of “sex” (including the criminal repression of male homosexuality) at both the center and the periphery of the Empire was instrumental for colonial control in times of unrest (Sanders, 2009). This criminal prohibition — which remains intact in most places where it was introduced during colonial times — is a tangible trace of the Eurocentric colonization of other sexualities (Corrêa, Petchesky and Parker, 2008; Corrêa, Richard-Davis, & Parker, 2013; ILGA, 2013).

These historical trajectories had particular salience at the African Regional Dialogue in light of the recent politicization of sexualities in several countries where conservative religious and political authorities have condemned “sexual rights” as a neocolonial imposition. Countering with the defense of a (presumably unitary) “African culture”, national political leaders such as Presidents Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, Goodluck Jonathan of Nigeria and Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe have pushed to tighten criminal laws against homosexuality in recent years, decrying it as “un-African” (Reddy, 2001; Epprecht, 2010; Kaoma, 2012). Affiliates of the US-based Catholic organization Human Life International in several countries (among other religious and political voices) have campaigned

4 Sanders’s (2009) analysis is particularly insightful as it retraces the origins of the sodomy proscription to Henry VIII’s attacks against the Catholic Church, when the sodomy law was used mainly against friars. He also recaptures how Lord Macaulay, the main British administrator of India, was central to the adoption of the new code in 1861 and examines the paradox of postcolonial nation states that have kept the code and article intact, quite often with the same number 377 (or 77). While sodomy laws were systematically instituted in British colonies, France abolished its criminalization in 1791. Such measures were therefore not instituted systematically across the French Empire in the same way, although they were instituted in a few colonies such as Benin, Cameroon, and Senegal (Human Rights Watch, 2008).

5 For detailed information on countries where sodomy laws inherited from colonial governments are still in place, see www.ilga.org. It is also worth noting that colonial powers bequeathed other criminal laws in areas such as abortion and prostitution, laws that also remain in place in many countries.
against birth control and abortion, likewise attributing them to neocolonial machinations aimed at population control (Kaoma, 2012; Buss & Herman, 2003).

In responses echoed at the African Regional Dialogue, sexual rights advocates on the continent have challenged this unitary construction of tradition both by reclaiming precolonial African traditions of same-sex desire and gender variance — as in the case of Zimbabwean activists’ appropriation of the term humgochani (to refer to homosexuality) (Epprecht, 2004) — and by underscoring the entanglement of existing legal frameworks and prevailing constructions and re-constructions of tradition with the colonial projects they purport to reject. This entanglement operates at two levels. First, such laws and constructions simultaneously internalize and erase the effects of colonial laws against sodomy and indecency, projecting them onto an idealized precolonial past. For example, in a brief presented to the South African parliament, the network of LGBT groups pressing for the Civil Unions Act, which legalized same-sex marriage, sought to demystify this view, countering: “Homosexuality is African; Homophobia is unAfrican” (Yarbrough, 2013). Second, sexual rights advocates have underscored the distortion of political constructions of “African tradition” or “culture” that occurred through their re-articulation with the structures of colonial rule. By grafting the rationalized techniques of modern statecraft, such as the codification of law, onto a more plural and flexible terrain of competing traditional practices, this transformation selectively sanctioned an account of African tradition that reflected dominant interests within the groups brought under its rule, at the same time establishing a new political vocabulary that finds echo in contemporary political debates (Chanock, 1989).

As Tamale succinctly summarized in the paper mentioned above, the dominant discourses of culture in contemporary Africa largely derive from constructions and reinterpretations by former colonial authorities in collaboration with African male patriarchs. Yet it is important to emphasize that in critiquing patriarchal deployments of “culture” — often framed in terms of a rights-versus-culture dichotomy in contemporary debates — Tamale was not affirming a transcendent notion of “rights"
as somehow “cultureless” or rejecting “culture” as inherently opposed to rights, to be overcome on the road to universality. Countering the binary arguments sometimes raised by sexual rights advocates, both in Africa and elsewhere, Tamale underscored the importance of working with and through culture in ways that recognize its mutability and the possibilities it opens as a “tool for emancipation.” “Culture,” she concluded, “is a double-edged sword that can be wielded creatively and resourcefully to enhance women’s access to sexual justice”.

Certain parallels are worth noting between these observations and discussions about postcolonial legacies at the other regional dialogues. In Latin America, as Pecheny and de la Dehesa noted in their panoramic paper, populist governments had key transformative effects in much of the region well into the twentieth century, enacting the first major pieces of labor legislation and social welfare policies. This key transition saw the mobilization of a first wave of feminist activism in various countries in the region around questions like access to birth control and women’s suffrage and had paradoxical effects on racial and ethnic politics in the region as well. Under populist regimes, integrative ideologies of “racial democracy” provided the foundation for new constructions of national identity, suggesting that the absence of legal segregation and widespread miscegenation in the region meant that the exclusionary legacies of slavery and colonialism had been resolved, and that racism was not a salient political issue. Retaining a fundamentally Eurocentric teleology, these ideologies were contradicted by the continued marginalization of people of indigenous and African descent, who continued to mobilize to contest these barriers. But they also subordinated political claims based on race and ethnicity to a dominant political discourse that privileged the language of social class. These ideologies of racial democracy and miscegenation persisted under the brutal military dictatorships that spread throughout the region in the 1960s and 1970s to counter the social transformations enacted by populist rule.

Transitions from these authoritarian regimes to formally democratic states beginning in the late 1970s saw a resurgence of activism around gender and sexualities, spearheaded by a second
wave of feminist activism, as well as a resurgence of mobilization for racial justice. Over time, the emergence of these parallel and partially overlapping movements has shed light on the complex intersections of crosscutting forms of oppression as well as significant tensions within sexual rights movements themselves. As Pecheny and de la Dehesa noted, it was in the context of quincentennial celebrations of the European “discovery” of the Americas in 1992 (celebrations that underscored the persistent Eurocentrism of significant sectors of Latin American elites) that Black feminists from the region organized the First Meeting of Black Women from Latin America and the Caribbean, where over 300 activists from 32 countries established a network to sustain their activities. A few years later, indigenous women activists, contesting their lack of representation at a preparatory meeting organized by feminists for the Beijing Conference on Women, created an alternative mechanism for deliberations in preparation for Beijing and subsequently convened the First Continental Meeting of Indigenous Women of the First Nations of Abya Yala in 1996 in Quito, Ecuador, where they established a regional network of indigenous women (Alvarez et al., 2002). More recently, activists mobilizing behind the adoption of an Inter-American Convention on Sexual and Reproductive Rights have organized regional meetings bringing together indigenous and feminist leaders to address possible tensions between the two movements’ agendas, such as the relative weight given to collective and individual rights in their respective agendas.

These debates speak in part to the ongoing legacies of internal colonialism that racially and ethnically marginalized communities faced well after national independence. In ways that loosely parallel debates around customary law and traditional chieftaincies in African polities, indigenous activists have claimed the right to various forms of political autonomy and self-determination. Though inflected by local histories of colonialism, state-building, and racial formation, these claims by First Nations activists simultaneously use the language of rights while reclaiming normative traditions outside of colonial liberalism. In the paper presented at the Latin American Regional Dialogue, Franklin Gil Hernández (2011) examined some of these themes, noting, for instance, recent public debates in Colombia over the question of “female genital mutilation” in the Emberá-Chami ethnic
group and on the relative priority given to the issue of abortion, regarded by some as responding primarily to an international agenda. In these debates, Gil explained, repeated charges were made that feminism amounted to a colonizing enterprise, imposing alien cultural values.

Echoing discussions at the African Regional Dialogue, Gil underscored the importance of an intersectional lens in sexual politics. Such a lens would permit attentiveness to two equally important issues that often tend to obscure one another: relations of male domination within marginalized ethnic communities, a concern that women within those communities have raised repeatedly; and the ways in which certain deployments of sexual health and rights discourses coming from the North do in fact harbor the potential for neocolonial dynamics, reinvoking the problematic history of metropolitan claims to universality.

Moreover, in ways that again echo some of the dilemmas posed by the governmentalization of “culture” and ethnic identities discussed at the African Regional Dialogue, Gil used the term “government of differences” to refer to a mode of governmentality of growing importance in Colombia (and elsewhere in Latin America). In these contexts too, the state responds to and organizes gender and sexuality rights claims following almost the same logic used in the nineteenth century to govern “populations” or “races” (whites, black, diverse indigenous communities, mestizos). In doing so, Gil noted, states often translate these complex and cross-cutting intersectional demands into discrete institutional and identity based categories (children, women, sexual diversity, Afro-Colombians, indigenous groups, people with disabilities, etc.) in ways that often amount to tokenism and undermine the possibilities for a coalitional politics. On the contrary, these governmental tactics often provoke competition among movements for access to resources and political attention. Once again, the governmental imperative to make populations legible (and thus governable) results in the institutional encapsulation of populations and atomization of social movements.
Troubling binaries: Identity and modernity at the Asian Regional Dialogue

Interestingly enough, the reverberations of colonial legacies and postcolonial state formation on contemporary sexual politics were not directly addressed as such at the Asian Regional Dialogue. This absence is particularly intriguing given the long history of precolonial Asian states, the depth of Asian states’ entanglement with colonial projects, as well as the existence of a significant literature on the effects of colonization and postcolonial conditions on modern state formation and re-configuration in the region (Chatterjee, 19896, 1993; Spivack, 1988, 1999). In our view, this primarily reflects the professional interests of the participants involved. That said, various debates at that regional dialogue examined the “problem of the state”, with a particular focus on the shifting boundaries of governmentality prompted by increased migration flows, the regulation of digital technologies, and the dilemmas of contemporary identity politics. In these contexts, participants alluded to dynamics that echoed some of the discussions at the other meetings and more directly addressed postcolonial dilemmas, albeit in more muted ways.

In this regard, for example, it is worth citing the presentations by Khuat Thu Hong, a researcher with the Institute for Social Development Studies in Vietnam, who explored public debates and moral panics relating to sexuality in that country. Hong described three recent sex scandals, all sparked by postings of “hot pictures and videos” in cyberspace. One of them involved a rising film star whose boyfriend posted a video on line of them having sex. The video prompted considerable debate, with the public divided on whether she was innocent or “promiscuous”. As events unfolded, she was accused and prosecuted for prostitution and sentenced to 18 months in a reeducation camp. After her release, she went into exile in the United States, and she is now considered to be the first Vietnamese “sexual exile”. As Hong argued, the scandals open a window onto some of the political and cultural contradictions experienced today in Vietnam. While new technologies have permitted a rediscovery of female sexual pleasure and agency and have given rise to a new
public discourse around a right to privacy, this has occurred in conjunction with a great deal of ambivalence. The Ministry of Culture has established new regulations such as dress codes for performers and Internet censorship, as well as educational media campaigns. According to Hong, these contradictory sociopolitical dynamics reflect a central tension between desires to modernize and desires to return to traditions.

A common theme addressed at all the dialogues, these multilayered tensions point to the emergence of a shared vocabulary that often mediates sexual politics in the global South. This vocabulary involves overlapping binaries between tradition and modernity, past and present, local and global, faith and science, culture and rights, even as these terms have distinct meanings reflecting the specific dynamics of national contexts. For example, the meaning of “tradition” varies widely between countries analyzed in the Dialogues — such as India, Indonesia Mexico, Nigeria or Vietnam — because if in some places religious forces and institutions play a strong role in defining “traditional” morality, in others sexual morals are embedded in predominantly secular cultures.

In the case of Vietnam, for instance, it is notable that the defense of “traditional” gender roles described by Hong occurs without reference to religious worldviews. Rather, it is deployed in the context of a secular state that lays claim to a socialist tradition, albeit modified in recent years through “market reforms”. Similarly with regard to China, researchers observed that “traditional values” have been advanced in the context of a socialist system restructured by market reforms. As Pan Suiming underscored, when the Communist Party began recruiting in rural areas in the 1920s, it developed a new public image based on sexual abstinence. Following the establishment of the revolutionary government in 1949, abstinence was reinforced as a tool of social control, including control of party cadres. Since 1978, however, Pan noted a certain opening of controls on people’s “private lives” as a means to shore up support for the regime. Yet, as Huan Yingying argued, the regulation of advertisements related to sexual products in public space is still constrained by state morality and policy priorities. These forces are evident in the distinctive ways in which condoms and
abortion services are advertised. Sexual morals still surround the ways in which the government promotes the use of condoms, by and large confining their use to married couples and restricting the time frames in which condom ads can appear on television. Abortion, which is instrumental to China’s population control policies, is, in contrast, widely advertised and not subject to moral restrictions. Both cases thus clearly illustrate how secular states, bound by strong principles of \textit{laïcité}, are also traversed by sexed and gendered moralities (see also Giang & Nguyen, 2007).

One area where such binary constructions have gained particular salience is in the politics surrounding same-sex desire and gender variance. The categories “gay”, “lesbian”, “bisexual”, and “transgender” are examples of what Rosalind Petchesky and Radhika Ramasubban, in their summary of proceedings at the Asian Regional Dialogue, referred to as “floating identities”. Such identities delineate the contours of a global discourse variably appropriated by national institutions and societal actors to different effects, yet their deployment coexists with much more complex and heterogeneous terrains of same-sex desire and gender variance that assume quite different forms. Petchesky and Ramasubban noted a central tension between the potentially liberatory possibilities opened to some sectors of society through these transnational categories and the difficult translation of a “kaleidoscopic panorama of sexual and gender diversity” into rigidly normativized legal and biopolitical categories. Once again, such categorization may be driven by the governmental imperatives to make populations legible, now paradoxically shared by governments, activists, international agencies, NGOs and donors.

To address these difficulties, some activists have found ways to navigate across discursive repertoires and identity categories in contextually specific and shifting ways. As the Filipino researcher and activist, Malu Marin, observed at the Interregional Dialogue, discussion of identity politics among many LGBT activists in Asia is both “rooted in indigenous heritages and experiences, such as those of the \textit{waria} in Indonesia, the \textit{hijra} in India, [and] the \textit{bakla} in the Philippines”, and “simultaneously shaped by global discourse and political developments”. This kind of navigation is premised on an
understanding of the provisional and contextually specific salience of particular identity categories, as Marin explained: “As practitioners in the field, we are fully cognizant that the meanings attached to these terms are perennially contested: labels are assigned different meanings in different locales. They also have subjective relevance and meaning to individuals who choose to identify with or attach themselves to such labels”. Marin’s observations resonate with Boellstorff’s (2005) and Jackson (2007) anthropological research on the selective appropriation of Western sexual categories by young people in Indonesia, who will call themselves gay and lesbian in some circumstances and not in others, depending on the context.

Two caveats are worth underscoring. First, such binaries between tradition and modernity, past and present, local and global, and so on, should not be accepted at face value. While it is important to take note of the colonial genealogies of contemporary political vocabularies, in part precisely to demystify such binaries, it is also important to recognize that situated political actors are deploying such frames not out of some atavistic impulse to return to the past but in response to very present social and political considerations. As Partha Chatterjee (1997) has suggested, often gendered, sexed, and racialized constructions of tradition operate today as mechanisms of selection to engage with processes of globalization and to construct competing modernities, which, like all contemporary cultural terrains, are inevitably hybrid.

In this regard, for example, participants at the African Regional Dialogue stressed the global linkages of political actors on the continent advancing homophobic and patriarchal political agendas in the name of tradition. They also highlighted how recent structural changes in contemporary national public spheres, particularly in the national media, have promoted these agendas, ultimately transforming the terms of political debate. In the context of Nigeria, for example, Dorothy Aken’Ova recounted how a media report condemning the House of the Rainbow as an “evil church” for its acceptance of gay people precipitated a moral panic, prompting an explosion in news coverage and police arrests that drove many of the people involved from their homes and ended in its
closure. During discussions at the dialogue, such examples were cited as reflecting not the weight of tradition but “the paradoxes of modernization” in Africa. Participants thus underscored how transformations associated with modernity, such as more competitive electoral politics and growing access to media, did not produce greater flexibility of gender and sexual norms but rather stimulated forces calling for greater restrictions.

Second, it is also important to note that the dilemmas described by Petchesky and Ramasubban in the case of Asia are only partially captured through binary constructions of the global and the local in particular and, indeed, are as much a function of the biopolitical technologies of administration institutionalized by contemporary states, regardless of the genealogy of specific identity categories. In this regard, for example, it is worth citing the presentation by Dédé Oetomo, also at the Asian Regional Dialogue, recalling the formal recognition of the waria in the 1970s by the Suharto dictatorship, following consultation with the recently created Council of Islamic Clerics, a move that made Indonesia the first Asian state to legitimize gender and body variance as a “third gender” and a legitimate category of state recognition. Oetomo, however, underscored the slippage between this univocal category, institutionalized by the state in the country in 1973, and the wide range of experiences it purports to capture, from individuals who modify their bodies through hormone use and sex reassignment surgery, to others whose identity, appearance, or dress does not cross gender lines. The example points to an inevitable slippage between rationalized identity categories instituted through state recognition, rooted in a governmental imperative of standardization, and the plurality of lived experiences they purport to represent.

**From colonialism to “national development”**

The years following World War II saw a second major wave of de-colonization (after the first, in the Americas, in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries). This second wave began with the independence of the Philippines (1946) and India (1947), followed by the stabilization of the Chinese
Revolution in 1949, which definitively broke with its semicolonial status while strengthening the socialist world, and then proceeded to sweep through Asia, the Middle East, the Caribbean and Africa, through the 1970s. Political sovereignty by no means overturned the prevailing asymmetries of the global system, which were in some ways reproduced in the post–World War II political order (Mazower, 2009) and also reinscribed into a bipolar order divided into capitalist and socialist camps. With the creation of the Bretton Woods institutions and the UN system, the contours of a new project of development began to take shape. As Arturo Escobar (1995) describes: “The discourse of war was displaced onto the social domain and a new geographical terrain: the Third World. In the rapid globalization of US domination as a world power, the ‘war on poverty’ in the third world began to occupy a prominent place … The new emphasis was spurred by the recognition of chronic conditions of poverty and social unrest existing in poor countries and the threat they posed for more developed countries” (pp. 21–22). The term “Third World” was coined in 1952 by the French demographer Albert Sauvy, a high-level consultant to the UN Commission and Division on Population. Juxtaposed to the first world of advanced capitalist countries and the second world of the communist bloc, the term was incorporated into the new discourse of development to “describe societies that seemed to face difficulties in achieving the economic and political goals of either capitalist or socialist modernity”, though it was also appropriated by leaders and revolutionary movements from the region (as expressed, for example, in the Tricontinental Conference and the Non-Aligned Movement) to gesture toward the possibility of alternative pathways to modernization (Dirlik, 2007, p. 13).

An elaborate new international development infrastructure, informed by the precepts of postwar modernization theory, advanced not-so-new progress narratives. Once again the dominant story attributed Third World countries’ failure to modernize in good measure to purported cultural

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6 The term was inspired by the Third Estate of the French Revolution, which included the commoners (after the aristocracy and the clergy) (Litonjua, 2010).
limitations, with little regard to their position in a larger global order. This, even as national political leaders of many newly independent “developmentalist states” advanced projects of modernization informed by international models, if couched in nationalist terms. As with the modernizing projects of colonial powers, the governmentalization of the new development discourse unfolded through various strategies of intervention that were explicitly or implicitly sexed, gendered, classed and racialized. In South Korea, for example, the shifts and continuities from a regime of formal colonial subordination to formal national sovereignty in a global system marked by persistent power asymmetries was reflected in the transition from the system of sexual slavery created alongside the Japanese imperial military presence to the capitalist system of sex work established alongside the US military presence on the peninsula in the post-war period (Kim, 2005; Cho, 2008).

As the feminist scholars Hosu Kim and Grace M. Cho (2012) observe: “Through the 1960s and 70s military prostitution developed into a major institution for bolstering national security and became an important but unacknowledged part of South Korea’s nation-building project” (p. 10). Underscoring the paradoxically destructive and productive dimensions of conflict, they describe how the Korean War — as the first major battlefield of the Cold War — produced certain bodies as a “biopolitical excess” that underscored the contradiction between anticommunism and ethnic purity, the two central tenets of the South Korean leadership’s nation-building project. In this regard, the yanggonju, variably translated as Yankee whore, Western princess, GI bride, and UN lady, was simultaneously turned into a hyper-visible symbol in (both pro- and anti-US) nationalist discourses and a semi-clandestine figure alongside US military bases (Cho, 2008). At the same time, paradoxically, the biracial children of US soldiers and Korean women were particularly targeted by the state for placement in a fledgling industry of transnational adoption, recalling the anxieties around miscegenation of European colonial powers but now reinscribed by national leaders into ideologies of national development (Kim & Cho, 2012; Stoler, 1989 and 1997).

In India, as Jayashree Ramakrishna noted in her presentation at the Asian Regional Dialogue
(included in Volume I), the Indian National Family Planning Programme was, together with Mexico’s and China’s, one of the first population control programs established in the so-called Third World (Chatterjee & Riley, 2001; Connelly, 2006, 2008). Here again, it is worth noting the ambivalent position of national leaders advancing development projects vis-à-vis global development models that posited population control as their core in the 1970s. At the 1974 UN Conference on Population hosted at Bucharest, for instance, both India and China led developing countries in their resistance to internationally funded family planning programs. On that occasion, southern nations crafted the slogan: “Development is the best contraceptive”. However, immediately after the conference both countries established draconian fertility control programs (Corrêa & Reichmann, 1994).

In the case of India, the government launched a new national population policy in 1975, with considerable international financing from USAID and the Ford Foundation. It was regarded as a “key to development,” reflecting the neo-Malthusian global obsession with containing a feared “demographic explosion” but also projecting the image that a modern country, and within it modern families, should be able to control the “hubris” of excessive fertility, particularly in the case of poorer sectors. The alliance between new national elites advancing a vision of development and international actors resulted in a turn toward coercive measures. Between 1975 and 1977, Ramakrishna notes, the Program conducted over 8 million vasectomies, largely on poor, older, rural, and economically marginalized men, in the “none too hygienic conditions” of vasectomy camps, eventually provoking a national backlash and the defeat of the ruling government.

At the African Regional Dialogue, political scientist Sybille Nyeck situated her analysis of contemporary sexual politics in Africa against the backdrop of the complex political and policy dynamics at work in newly independent states and their contention with pressures from powerful states in the north. In her presentation (included in Volume I) Nyeck pushes back against an Africanist literature on “failed states” (with its echoes of modernization theory), while nonetheless underscoring the importance of considering the specificity of African state-formation and its limitations. Unlike European states,
which were created through protracted processes of internecine struggles, wars, economic crises, coups and counter-coups, she notes, African states acquired sovereignty largely by fiat, through acts of international recognition, and in some cases “still function without effective ownership of authority and control over administrative apparatuses”.

This history, she argues, explains the “dual pressure” faced by postcolonial African states, as they “must engage in the coercive work of state building to acquire domestic sovereignty, while behaving as if they were already mature states that can effectively respond to the demands of their societies in transition”. Nyeck traces the strategies used to confront this dual pressure, from the one-party systems that prevailed in the region immediately following independence to the formally democratic multiparty systems that have proliferated in much of the region since the 1990s. In this context, she identifies the demands of sexual rights advocates as largely “marginal issues”, which she defines in terms of their limited salience on the national political agenda. This position, she contends, contributes to the “paradox of advocacy” for sexual rights in African polities: “First, with increased activism can come increased resistance [by the state]. When the advocacy goal is perceived to be detrimental to the reputation of a state, as illustrated in human rights campaigns against torture or discrimination based on sexual orientation, the probability of coercing a targeted state into complying with human rights norms is small”. The situation is further complicated by activists’ dependence for possible solutions on the very states they are calling to account, a conundrum by no means unique to African polities.

Nyeck’s analysis of the marginalized position of sexual rights advocacy in African polities points to a larger dilemma faced by many actors in civil society in postcolonial contexts. Writing about colonial India, the historian Sudipta Sen (2002) underscores the reliance of Britain’s civilizing mission on “creating a civil society after its own image”, noting that “a colonial civil society that extended the particular history and political economy of Europe to absorb the world of the vanquished thus also placed the dependent community of the colonized outside the frame of discourse, what Enrique
Dussel has called the ‘metaphysical exteriority of peripheral cultures’” (p. 401). Echoes of this exteriorization of “peripheral cultures” persist in postcolonial contexts that mark the limits not only of state capacity, but also of the capacity of organized civil society to account fully for the lived experiences of national populations. In assessing the position of sexual rights advocates in Africa, Nyeck notes, on the one hand, the ability of activists to triangulate with international actors and deploy international norms of sexual and human rights in order to put pressure on governments, but on the other, a certain distancing of these demands from the everyday concerns of most people in the region. Of course, majoritarian assertions that “there are other priorities” are routinely deployed to deny the basic humanity of minority groups. Nyeck is careful to underscore that this is not her view or intention but rather to call for a more grounded activism, or as she puts it, a “revolution away from abstractions”. Her discussion, indeed, points to one of the central dilemmas in contemporary sexual politics raised at the dialogues: assessing the possibilities opened by democratic institutions and the language of rights in the current context of globalization and, above all, using these possibilities to link sexual rights to a broad range of economic and social issues that directly impact majorities of people.

The promise of rights

The final decades of the twentieth century saw the convergence of two developments with powerful consequences for the trajectory of sexual rights in the global South: the consolidation of an understanding of sexual and reproductive rights at the international level, as part of a larger reconfiguration of human rights frameworks; and the wave of political transitions to formal democracy that swept much of Asia, Africa and Latin America. As democratizing processes swept through these regions, the United Nations sponsored a series of conferences on the social dimensions of development and human rights. In 1993, at the International Human Rights Conference of Vienna, the rift between civil and political rights and social and economic rights that had prevailed since the end of he Second World War was overcome in conceptual terms with the recognition of the
indivisibility of human rights. That same year, the Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights was established. Vienna was preceded by the Children’s Summit (New York, 1990) and the Rio Summit on the Environment (1992) and was followed by the International Conference on Population and Development (Cairo, 1994), the Fourth World Conference on Women, (Beijing, 1995), and the World Conference on Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Related Intolerance (Durban, 2001). Also worth noting in the course of this history was the creation in 1996 of UNAIDS as an inter-agency initiative to respond to HIV and AIDS and the first General Assembly Special Session on HIV and AIDS, held in 2001. The normative outcomes of these negotiations were cumulative in that the debates from one conference fed into the subsequent one, resulting in sharp redefinitions of human rights principles and frameworks in relation to population concerns, gender equality, racial discrimination, and human rights approaches to HIV/AIDS and sexuality itself.

The results of the series of international conferences would quite often also be translated into the policy guidelines of various UN agencies. Furthermore, after the creation of the Human Rights Council in 2005, the new body has systematically discussed definitions in respect to human rights, gender, reproductive matters and sexuality. In the last eight years, the Human Rights Council, Human Rights Surveillance Committees, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and Special Rapporteurs have more intensively examined and debated these matters and delivered a series of relevant documents, particularly in relation to same-sex relations (O’Flaherty & Fisher, 2008; Arc International et al., 2012; United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2011). Sexual and reproductive rights activism and debates have also been at work at the level of the regional human rights systems in Europe, the Americas and Africa, albeit with uneven results across regions.

7 The sexuality and human rights debate at the level of the UN Human Rights Council was preceded by the emblematic debates around the frustrated Brazilian resolution on sexual orientation and human rights at the level of the now extinct Commission on Human Rights (see Corrêa, Petchesky & Parker, 2008; Girard, 2007).
The implications of this trajectory for transnational constructions of gender and sexuality are by no means trivial. As noted above, gender and sexuality have been deeply interwoven with colonization and postcolonial geopolitics. From the 1980s on, gender, reproductive rights and even sexuality, as related to HIV and AIDS, became transnational issues in activism, research and policy critiques. In the 1990s, sexuality and gender erupted in UN negotiations, provoking innumerable controversies. Entirely new conditions presided over the continued geopoliticization of these issues, and the power logics and knots linking governance, sexuality and gender in the past were openly contested. The voices of many of those directly affected by global norms and policies began to be heard and the presence of non-conforming gendered and sexual subjects became visible in global policy arenas, starting with feminists, then expanding to AIDS activists, LGBT activists, and sex worker and disability rights activists.

As some states gradually began to align with these agendas, reflecting internal processes of mobilization around gender and sexuality and their impact on legal and policy frames, conservative actors began systematically using human rights language to oppose the destabilization of hegemonic gender and sexual orders (Lemaitre, 2012; Mujica, 2007; Buss & Herman, 2003). Despite these forces’ strong resistance and the ensuing controversies, by the end of the 1990s, negotiations in the UN forum delivered new normative definitions of gender equality, women’s human rights, and non-discrimination, including in relation to HIV and AIDS and the concept of sexual rights (Girard, 2007).

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8 One main source of rethinking religious doctrines in human rights language is the Vatican and groups engaged in the elaboration of Catholic Constitutionalism. Lemaitre’s (2012) description of Catholic Constitutionalism in Latin America reads as follows: “In the last decade Catholic constitutionalism has spread across the Americas ... Its advocates are not the clergy but rather the faithful lay; they are lawyers, mostly well-heeled, educated white men, who advance constitutional and human rights arguments before legislatures and courts. They defend what the Church calls the “non-negotiable issues: the criminalization of abortion, and the limitation of marriage rights to heterosexual couples. These lawyers, however, either in expensive suits or in high heels, do not cite scriptures nor do they refer to Encyclical letters. Instead, they insist on a universal natural law available to human reason, without the recourse to faith or revelation” (p. 3). Among other organizations, Catholic Constitutionalism is connected with the US-based Population Institute, Human Life International and the NGO C-Fam created in 1997 to monitor UN negotiations.
Debates on citizenship rights claims in relation to gender and sexuality had been stirring in diverse national contexts since the 1960s, yet the outcome of the UN deliberations broke boundaries, re-conceptualized these claims as universal, and in some instances brought debates back to local levels to support or trigger new demands. This circuit is one clear example that the boundaries of nation-states had become more porous as international jurisdictions expanded and political claims crossed national borders in ways that unbundled conventional ties between sovereignty, territoriality and state power (Roseneau, 1997; Sassen, 1996). To use Appadurai’s (1996) conceptual frame, the vocabulary of gender and sexuality rights became detached from relatively coherent national political and cultural public spheres and started flowing through transnational ideoscapes. Gender and sexuality ideoscapes have in some instances carried with them critiques of the masculinist, imperialist, ethnocentric, legalistic and individualist imprints of hegemonic human rights frames (Bhattacharyya, 2008; Corrêa, Petchesky, & Parker, 2008; Corrêa & Petchesky, 2007). These processes at the level of human rights discourses and norms cannot be examined in isolation from other key features that characterize globalization, including hegemonic views in relation to the role of states and markets, as we elaborate below.

The development of an international agenda around sexual and reproductive rights as an extension of a broader human rights discourse coincided in many parts of the world with political transitions to formally democratic governments. Latin America in particular saw a remarkable transformation, as the dictatorships that ruled almost every country in the 1970s gave way to formal representative democracies almost everywhere across the region by the new millennium. In sub-Saharan Africa, 70 presidential elections involving more than one candidate were held across most of the region’s 48 countries between 1989 and 2000, and by the late 1990s, 39 national legislatures had representatives

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9 Human rights treaty bodies began reviewing violations perpetrated by states in relation to gender and sexuality more systematically. Specific cases have also been brought to the attention of these bodies, resulting in groundbreaking decisions and recommendations, such as the conclusion of the Toonen vs. Australia case (1994), when the Committee on Humans Rights that monitors the Convention on Civil and Political Rights concluded that the sodomy law in place in the state of Tasmania infringed the treaty.
from at least two parties (Van de Walle, 2002; Ochieng, 2012). In Asia, where China in particular remains an important counterweight to this international trend, societal mobilization nonetheless led to the consolidation of electoral democracies in several countries, including South Korea, the Philippines, East Timor, Mongolia, Nepal, Indonesia and more recently Myanmar (Thompson, 2001; Yun-han, 2006; Diamond, 1997; 2012).

Participants at the dialogues focused attention on the implications of this convergence of international norms with democratic reforms in various countries. While in some cases this juncture has undeniably opened possibilities for the formal recognition of sexual and reproductive rights, the entanglement of emerging norms with the tradition of liberalism and the power asymmetries of the global system has also complicated the political terrain that sexual rights advocates have to navigate. The deployment of liberal feminist and sexual rights frames to justify projects of military intervention in the context of the so-called War on Terror has paradoxically strengthened opponents in many countries who frame these rights as a neocolonial imposition while obscuring local and national traditions that might provide alternative bases of support (Amar, 2013; Puar, 2007). Moreover, the formal recognition of these rights in societies where they are routinely negated in practice casts doubt on the real possibilities they offer, even in the best of circumstances.

Examples can undoubtedly be cited in Asia, Africa and Latin America where national transitions of formal democracy created propitious conditions for activist mobilization and the recognition of sexual and reproductive rights. The political ferment that drove Brazil’s transition to democracy in the 1970s and 1980s, for example, saw broad-based mobilization by women, gays, lesbians, travestis, prostitutes, and people living with HIV, many framing contestation of the sex–gender order as part of a larger project of economic, political and cultural transformation. Much of that energy would be directed toward influencing the Constitution of 1988, a foundational document that for the first time established formal equality between men and women and laid the basis for important subsequent reforms (Tabak, 1989; CFEMEA, 2006; Htun, 2003; Vianna & Lacerda, 2004; de la Dehesa, 2010).
In South Africa as well, in part reflecting the mobilization of women and gay activists within and outside the African National Congress, the Constitution of 1996 asserted the state’s responsibility to ensure women’s political and socioeconomic equality, created the Commission on Gender Equality, and became the first in the world to include an antidiscrimination clause that included sexual orientation, among other forms of discrimination (Hames, 2006; Gouws, 2004; Yarbrough, 2013; Reddy, 2001; Hassim, 2007). Similarly, in Nepal’s protracted history of political reform, women played an important role in the People’s Movement and the People’s Liberation Army, which fought in the country’s decade-long civil war. The interim constitution, in force since 2007, recognized women’s right to reproductive health and instituted protections from violence and discrimination against women (Cottrell, 2008; Women’s Caucus of the Constituent Assembly, 2010). Moreover, in a landmark ruling that same year, the Supreme Court recognized the rights of sexual and gender minorities, calling for the elimination of discriminatory laws in the country, the establishment of a commission to study same-sex marriage, and official recognition of a third gender category contemplating the country’s metis (Divan & Narraim, 2007: Pant & Standing, 2011).10

Each of these cases reflects complex and distinct national histories requiring closer consideration, but taken together they suggest certain commonalities as well. On one level, they speak to the political opportunities that transitions to formal democracy in many countries (though certainly not everywhere) have opened to sexual rights activists. In these moments of enormous change and uncertainty, generally punctuated by the revision of foundational documents (constitutions, civil and criminal codes, municipal organic laws, etc.), activists have been able to attain formal achievements, particularly by articulating ties with other social movements and framing their demands as part of a larger project of political transformation. Universalist discourses of citizenship and human rights have often been central to this type of coalition-building. In her presentation at the African Regional

10 See also http://www.bds.org.np/index.html.
Dialogue, Sybille Nyeck stressed precisely the need for sexual rights advocates on the continent to articulate their demands with other agendas in civil society if they are to find greater resonance in societies and move from the “margins” to the center of political debate. While coalition-building has proven important to increasing political support for sexual rights, counter-majoritarian institutions such as electoral systems with proportional representation, party and parliamentary quotas for women, and court systems have also proven important in some cases to ensuring sexual rights advocates a political voice and protecting these rights against majoritarian veto. At the Interregional Dialogue, for example, Malu Marin underscored the importance of a recent ruling by the Supreme Court of the Philippines granting accreditation to the LGBT political party, Ang Ladlad, overturning an earlier decision by the national Commission on Elections that rejected the party’s petition on the grounds of alleged immorality. Spanning both new and well-established democracies, recent high court rulings have also been pivotal to guaranteeing women’s inheritance rights under customary law in Botswana and loosening restrictions on abortion in Colombia, among many examples that might be cited.

Yet political transitions to formal democracy have not created such openings in all instances. Indeed, as various participants at the dialogues noted, such political reforms have in many cases created difficulties for sexual rights advocacy by fostering the political mobilization of opponents, especially those grounding their opposition in conservative interpretations of religion, who often have the capacity to mobilize a much larger political base. Such dynamics were evident, for example, in the tightening of abortion legislation in Nicaragua, where, just prior to the 2006 election, the national congress, dominated by the center-left Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) and the right-wing Liberal Constitucionalist Party (PLC), voted unanimously to abolish a stipulation in the 1893 criminal code permitting abortion in cases when pregnancy poses a risk to a woman’s health. Despite petitions by feminists, the Health Ministry, and the medical community to delay the vote until after the election, both parties precipitated the process to curry favor with the Catholic Church (Kampwirth, 2003; Motenegro, 2006; Gago, 2007; Kane. 2008). The legal theoretist Juan
Marco Vaggione, in his presentation at the Latin American Dialogue (included in the first Volume) underscored the challenges posed to sexual rights advocates by the new legitimacy of the Catholic Church and of other conservative religious voices positioning themselves more broadly as civil society actors in the region’s emerging democracies.

Moreover, such celebratory accounts of formal achievements generally obscure much more than they reveal, and while several participants at the dialogues underscored the continued salience of the language of rights, they generally did so with a critical eye to its limitations and contradictions. For one, a narrow focus on debates unfolding in national public spheres too easily reifies dominant nationalisms and understandings of gender and sexuality in the singular. This dilemma relates to some of the limitations of a politics based on “floating identities” mentioned above, as formal debates in national public spheres can obscure the heterogeneous landscapes structuring relations of gender and sexuality at the level of everyday life (Crenshaw, 2000).

At the Asian Regional Dialogue, for example, Khartini Slamah cited the importance of the Declaration of Transgender Rights in Asia and the Pacific, a statement firmly grounded in international human rights accords, as the basis for framing a politics of recognition for transgender people in the region. While appealing to a global language to make visible a population generally ignored in public policy is necessary and probably politically inevitable in the current global landscape, Slamah also acknowledged the slippage between transgender identity as an abstract category and the lived experiences of people whose lives that category purports to represent. Indeed, participants at that meeting expressed a more general frustration about the injunction to ground human rights claims in fixed identities, with all their limitations, while at the same time recognizing the greater efficacy in the region of articulating claims in this way, as compared to discourses that eschew identity categories such as the banner of “sexual diversity”. Among other things, this dilemma underscores activism’s close entanglement with prevailing technologies of governamentality, as civil society actors come to adopt the language of the state and mirror its logic.
It is important to recognize that many of these observations reflect dynamics that are not peculiar to sexual politics. Rather, they recall longstanding Marxist and feminist critiques underscoring how the structures of national (as well as international) public spheres constrain debate and limit access in ways that both reproduce and obscure underlying power asymmetries in societies at large. It is important to recognize the ways in which organized sectors of civil society have successfully challenged unjust social exclusions, expanding the boundaries of public debate through rights-based claims-making. Nonetheless, what counts as “civil society” in the first place (what modes of organization are recognized; what language gets heard) is itself significantly structured by social inequalities and constrained by the prevailing discursive parameters of political debate.

These broader critiques of democratic public spheres have relevance for recent transitions to formal democracy as well. Such processes of political reform almost never result in the foundation of an entirely new polity (though they are often mythologized as such). Rather, they generally unfold in uneven and partial ways, through processes that involve pact-making, negotiation, conflict, and repression among diverse sectors within both authoritarian governments and opposition forces. The new democracies that emerge from these transitions often retain significant elements of outgoing regimes and institute measures designed specifically to safeguard private property and other bases of entrenched social power (O’Donnell & Schmitter, 1986).

These contradictions were made poignantly clear at the Interregional Dialogue in the presentation by activist Hossam Baghat, from the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, on the first phase of the Egyptian popular revolution (2011–2013). Baghat (2011) underscored the palpable, if ephemeral, sense of unity felt within the opposition in the days leading up to the ouster of Egyptian dictator Hosni Mubarak in February 2011:

Everybody was feeling togetherness for a moment, and it is this togetherness that people are now missing. There was this moment when we gained access to Tahrir Square, Mubarak
was still in power so we were united and we were all one. We were all one not in a theoretical or abstract sense but we all coexisted. We were all overwhelmed by love for each other. And now, in an almost childlike way, we are saying, where did the love go? We are unclear about the future of the country.\textsuperscript{11}

This uncertainty regarding Egypt’s future was reflected in Baghat’s ambivalent assessment of the political juncture in which Egyptian activists found themselves at the time. On the one hand, Baghat cited reasons for optimism in the widespread expressions of civic engagement, volunteerism, and youth organizing inspired by the revolution and how this moment of apparent (though fleeting) democratic reform seemed to open up potential spaces for new political voices, including those of sexual rights advocates. Nonetheless, he also underscored the “huge discrepancy” between the expectations awakened by the revolution and the political reforms that had been instituted since Mubarak’s ouster: “Protests may have removed a president, but really the regime is still being dismantled in almost the same incremental ways that we witnessed under Mubarak. We have to use litigation and advocacy and public mobilization for every move”. He further noted the difficult transition within the transition, as opposition sectors refocused their attention from toppling a dictator to the difficult task of institution building, often splintering into various interest groups attempting “to elbow their issues into the decidedly limited space for public debate”. The military coup of 2013, of course, vividly illustrated how precarious the opening represented by such moments of political reform can be in reality.

Participants at the Latin American Dialogue expressed a similar frustration with the limits of democratization. In particular, the historical anthropologist, Elsa Muñiz from Mexico, highlighted the different political realities experienced at the state level. The protracted and partial process

\textsuperscript{11} This quoting comes from the transcript of Hossam Baghat presentation at a public debate that took place in Rio during the 2011 SPW Inter-Regional Dialogue.
of democratic reform that resulted in the defeat of the presidential candidate of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) in 2000 broke its grip on the federal executive after 70 years of hegemonic party rule (if only briefly, with its return to the presidency 12 years later, aided by longstanding ties with Mexico’s dominant media conglomerates). This juncture in national politics produced an array of political coalitions and possibilities for sexual rights advocates at the local level. As Muñiz observed, such disparities were particularly evident on the question of abortion. After the Mexico City Legislative Assembly decriminalized abortion in the first trimester in 2007, a measure whose constitutionality was upheld by the national Supreme Court the following year, 18 states responded by tightening restrictions on abortion, in some states following up with arrests of women who had undergone the procedure. This remarkably rapid backlash to the Mexico City law, in some cases involving amendments to state constitutions recognizing the personhood of the fetus after little or no debate, reflected the close political coordination among PRI lawmakers, legislators with the right-wing National Action Party, and Catholic authorities. Muñiz cited this example as illustrative of the “paradoxes” created by “a hyper-democratic discourse that recognizes diversity and defends the rule of law, while at the same time constantly exercising force with impunity through various government bodies”.

The paradoxes Muñiz described speak not just to the limits of democratization but also to the fragmented and often contradictory nature of the state more generally (democratic or not). In this regard, her analysis evokes recent theorizing that approaches the state not as a unified structure but as “the powerful metaphysical effect of practices that make such structures appear to exist” (Mitchell, 1991b, p. 94). By focusing not on how the state sees the world (as James Scott would have it) but on how the world sees the state, this approach highlights the shifting and provisional boundaries between the state and society as well as the powerful concentration of symbolic capital that permits the state to be instantiated simultaneously as “objectivity, in the form of specific organizational structures and mechanisms, and subjectivity in the form of mental structures and categories of perception and thought” (Bourdieu, 1994, p. 4). The ultimate picture of the state that
emerges, then, “is one of messiness rather than smooth functioning, one of power rather than neutrality, one of tensions between power and resistance rather than outright domination, and one of variability rather than fixity” (Kim-Puri, 2005, p. 146). While undoubtedly applicable to other contexts, this approach seems particularly salient today in light of contemporary transformations in governamentality promoted by neoliberal formulas. We return to the present juncture below.
The economic transformations that occurred in the last twenty years as consequences of the complex processes of globalization have had social consequences whose dimensions cannot be overstated. Among these, several scholars have underscored the increased velocity of the post-1991 era (2010a, 2010b; Giddens, 2000; Tomlinson, 2007, 2008). The acceleration of time perception under the impact of capitalism, or more precisely the linkage between the circulation of money and the rhythm of social life, is not exactly a new phenomenon, having been examined in depth, for example, by the German sociologist Georg Simmel in the beginning of the twentieth century. Tomlinson (2007, 2008) revisited these early reflections on capitalism, speed, and social life and coined the term “fast capitalism” to refer to the intensification and acceleration in the mobility of the capitalist order experienced today. In Tomlinson’s words, this fastness results from qualitative changes in the nature of capitalism:

Some of these changes are in the techniques of production and exchange of actual commodities … flexible, global sourcing of materials and components, a global distribution of labor. Others are essentially sophistications in the manipulation of capitalist markets, especially in the sphere of financing … [But] what makes contemporary capitalism fast are communication rich systems: from web based work flow systems and “just in time” delivery logistics to the near instantaneous speed of computerized fund transfers systems combined with the speed of market intelligence via internet. (Tomlinson, 2008, p. 85)
Another unprecedented aspect of contemporary global transformations concerns the reproduction and reshaping of economic inequalities worldwide. From the 1990s onward, until the 2008 financial crisis, the global economy experienced steady rates of growth on average, though with ups and downs and great unevenness across regions and countries. This cycle of growth, however, was accompanied by increased income inequalities, even in the case of countries that had long sustained relatively balanced patterns of internal distribution (United Nations, 2005; Stiglitz, 2013). The current panorama of global inequalities is still defined by significant gaps in wealth and income between OECD and southern countries and the concentration of global profits in the hands of originally Western transnational corporations. But a novel cartography of global inequalities is also emerging that blurs the classical pyramidal image of disparities between center and periphery, in which Western countries and their elites occupied the tiny top echelon and the poor people of the postcolonial world constituted its massive base.

Distribution of wealth is becoming increasingly dispersed across multiple stratified tiers comprising old and new elites, middle classes, formal and informal laborers and the entirely dispossessed. These tiers cut across national boundaries and are particularly vulnerable to the impact of systemic instabilities (Held et al., 1999; Hoogvelt, 2001; Munk, 2004). Global inequalities are today

12 In an article titled “Inequality is a Choice”, published in The New York Times (Oct. 13, 2013) the Nobel laureate in economics, Joseph Stiglitz, develops the following analysis with regard to the impacts of globalization after 1989: “While the gap between some regions has markedly narrowed — namely, between Asia and the advanced economies of the West — huge gaps remain. Average global incomes, by country, have moved closer together over the last several decades, particularly on the strength of the growth of China and India. But overall equality across humanity, considered as individuals, has improved very little”.

13 Brazil and South Africa have been historically unequal societies whose internal economic discrepancies are deeply marked by race. Brazil, which experienced exponential growth rates in the 1970s, was frequently described as a cautionary example of growth without redistribution. In the 2000s inequality has been reduced, although wealth disparities remain glaring. Increases in inequality have been remarkable in post-Soviet Russia as well as China and India, where significant rural–urban disparities persist.

14 The sequential financial crises underway since the mid-1990s have directly affected these patterns, the most recent example to be found in the deepening of inequality and growth of poverty in the United States and Europe as a consequence of the 2008 financial crisis. These trends contrast with rising employment rates and decreasing poverty levels in the so-called emergent countries (even when levels of inequality have greatly increased in India and China and remain unacceptably high in Brazil and South Africa).
manifested across boundaries of North and South but also among (and within) countries in these regions. As mapped out by new geographic and urban global studies, enclaves of wealth and high consumption are easily found today in postcolonial locations, just as patterns of exclusion and poverty once regarded as characteristically southern have spread, albeit unevenly, across the economic North (Sassen, 2001; Harvey, 2001; Balibar, 2003).

These rapid economic reconfigurations are intrinsically associated with deep demographic transformations, including sharp declines in mortality rates; the reduction, faster than predicted, of fertility in many southern countries; ongoing and accelerating urbanization in all regions; and the intensification and multi-directionality of international migration flows. In quantitative terms, between 1975 and 2007, the global urban population grew from 1.5 to 3.2 billion people; in the case of Africa and Asia urban dwellers more than tripled, from 107 to 373 million and from 574 to 1,645 million, respectively. In 2008, for the first time in history, half the world’s population was living in urban areas (United Nations, 2008).15 Between 2000 and 2010, the number of international migrants increased from 150 to 214 million, representing roughly 3 percent of the world’s population, of which 50 percent were women.

The specter of global economic forces and structural conditions — including market forces, trade and labor relations, consumerism, demographic trends, and the pace and contours of “globalization” — haunted all three dialogues, more or less explicitly. In the course of the dialogues, whenever participants scrutinized issues more precisely located at the crossroads between sexualities and economics, the relevance of these economic and demographic forces, trends and patterns became more sharply evident. Three areas in particular were emphasized in these discussions. First, several

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15 It should be noted, however, that even today, the urban population remains highly concentrated in a group of 25 highly populated countries (of which the first ten are China, India, USA, Brazil, Indonesia, Russian Federation, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria and Germany). The data on migration offered here comes from the report, An Overview of Urbanization, Internal migration, population distribution and development in the world, published by the United Nations Population Division, in 2008 (UN/POP/EGM-URB/2008/01, 14 January 2008).
case studies addressed the gendered and sexual dimensions of international migration and state efforts to control people’s mobility, a topic that received particular attention at the Asian and Latin American Dialogues. Second, the Latin American Dialogue in Rio de Janeiro gave particular attention to the micropolitics of the sex industry and related markets. Third, at the Asian Dialogue in Hanoi, participants addressed economic forces propelling new technologies — sexual and reproductive medical products, the Internet and cell phones — and their effects on sexual communities (Ganesh, 2010; see also Tan in Volume I). This section charts the first two domains, and we will examine the third further ahead.

Embodied movements

It is no accident that international migration became a central topic of concern in the Hanoi discussions. In 2010, 28 million Asian migrants were dispersed across the world (roughly 13 percent of all transnational migrants), and countries in the region were the destination for 28 percent of global migrants, the large majority coming from other Asian nations. Latin America presents a slightly different picture, receiving just 3 percent of all transnational migrants that same year. Yet as in Asia, the outward-migration of Latin Americans has doubled in the last two decades from 11 to 20 million, with over 70 percent moving to the United States (OECD, 2010).

These movements have prompted reconfigurations of the boundaries of citizenship and the state and a reimagining of national communities. Many sending states, in part motivated by economic considerations, have extended dual citizenship, the vote, and in a few instances even political representation to emigrant communities; altered consular services to sustain diasporic attachments; and created matching funds and other programs to attract and channel remittances into development projects (Levitt & de la Dehesa, 2003; Itzigsohn, 2000; Jones-Correa, 2001). At the same time, recent decades have also seen an unprecedented tightening of restrictions on immigration. According to the United Nations (2002), by 2001, 44 percent of so-called developed countries and 39 percent
of so-called developing ones had policies to restrict immigration in place (compared to 18 percent and 3 percent respectively, in 1976) (p. 18). Against the backdrop of the global war on terror, this unprecedented securitization of borders has been facilitated and intensified by new surveillance technologies and accompanied by policies like body searches, identity cards, and surveillance cameras in public spaces within national borders (Pécoud & de Gucheteneire, 2006). In addition to policies designed to suppress immigration, many countries have established strict regulations, contracts and treaties to regulate migrants, their labor, and their remittances.

The analyses presented and debated at the dialogues addressed first and foremost the contradictions of this shifting terrain, noting, for example, the sharp contrast between the free flow of capital and goods across the globe and the stringent state regulations and restrictions faced by people on the move, including to northern countries. These restrictions, fueled by both xenophobia and economic interests, are the source of widespread violations of immigrants' human rights, including their sexual and reproductive rights.

Above all, participants at the dialogues underscored the heterogeneity of migrant experiences, evident, for example, in the motivations triggering transnational migration today. From seeking basic livelihood to escaping from restrictive living conditions at home to pursuing imagined visions of the good life elsewhere, transnational migrants have constituted, to borrow Appadurai's (1996) term, diasporas of hope, survival and despair. As Malu Marin observed in her presentation at the Interregional Dialogue, held in Rio in 2011:

While most people move or migrate due to economic reasons, there are also many other factors that prompt them to leave their countries of origin. This includes the desire for adventure and the need for unbridled gender and sexual expression, away from the shackles of family and society. In so doing, they develop the ability to live a transnational existence, embodying their truest selves, at the same time, adjusting to and confronting the limits of
what their states of origin and destination mandate. Such is the experience of Filipino and Indonesian lesbians working as domestic workers in Hong Kong or Thai and Filipino trans persons working as entertainers in Japan, or South Asian gay men moving to the Middle East, which they perceive as having more permissive attitudes towards same-sex sexual activities. (Marin, 2011, p. 3)

This insight echoes the findings of the case study presented by the anthropologist, Adriana Piscitelli, at the Latin American Regional Dialogue analyzing the experience of Brazilian women who migrate to Spain to work in the sex industry. The majority of women interviewed by Piscitelli have completed secondary education and come from the mid- to lower strata of the middle class rather than the poorest sectors of society. In speaking about the motivations to migrate, the majority of respondents said that they aspired to both social and economic mobility, as sex work pays much better in Spain than in Brazil. But many of them also moved because of imagined prospects of adventure and glamorous experiences in Europe.

Not surprisingly, the heterogeneity of migrant experiences extends to encounters with the state restrictions and policing discussed above. As Lia Scortino underlined in her overview of South East Asia, regional cross-boundary migration is mainly triggered by growing demand for low-skilled labor in the case of middle income countries, although certain settings, like Singapore, also attract people with higher educational levels. Unlike high-skilled labor migrants, who are encouraged to bring their families to the country of destination, low-skilled labor migrants cannot bring or establish families, and are usually subjected to various forms of social exclusion and discrimination. These conditions, as we discuss below, mostly have impacts on the lives of migrant women and of persons whose sexual markers do not fit into dominant norms. Along similar lines, Ofélia Becerril, studied the experiences of Mexican seasonal agricultural laborers who travel to Canada to work in the harvests, under a bilateral agreement signed between the two countries (Programa de Trabajadores Agrícolas Temporales – PTAT). She identified sharp inequalities in relation to salaries and labor rights of
Canadian workers, who also work as temporary laborers, and those of Mexican migrants. In these various settings, gender and sexuality markedly add to the differentials of class, race and national origin that lurk beneath unequal pay, treatment by employers and state regulations.

These patterns of inequity that contaminate international migration strikingly illustrate the multilayered and spatially fragmented characteristics of inequalities in times of globalization. The causes and markers of inequalities travel and may be recreated as people move and settle elsewhere. Low-skilled labor migrants in Asia may be better paid than people from their class or caste in their countries of origin, but they are often subject to greater levels of social exclusion and discrimination in receiving countries. Canadian agricultural laborers may be at the bottom end of the national labor force but have a higher status and relatively greater privileges compared to the Mexican migrants with whom they work in the harvests.

One key insight of the dialogues in relation to migration is that, as Sciortino noted in her presentation at the Hanoi Dialogue, the sexed and gendered dimensions of both migration flows and regulations are obscured by dominant representations of migration as a gender-neutral and asexual phenomenon, even when half of emigrants today are women (both globally and specifically in Asia). An ideological smoke screen thus conceals how gender and sexuality systems structure the causes, motivations and effects of migration, and how gender and sexual orders articulate with the rules established by states and employers to define who can and cannot migrate and discipline migrants’ behavior.

In fact, gender and sexuality imprints are prominent everywhere. In the case of Vietnam, for example, as Le Bach Duong discussed in his presentation in Hanoi, the state’s explicit regulation of sexuality takes the form of migration “contracts” that govern morally accepted exchanges with South Korea, a country where a relatively high number of Vietnamese women migrate to marry and become wives. At the same time, Duong noted, Vietnamese women who migrate under state contracts as domestic workers to Taiwan have to comply with strict rules of sexual behavior. Furthermore, the
entry of foreign women into Vietnam, particularly from the poorer neighboring countries of Laos and Cambodia, is highly restricted and conditioned by a dominant social perception that these women will potentially engage in sex work, which is criminalized, with the possibility of confinement in re-education camps. Significantly, anti-trafficking raids in neighboring Cambodia often target Vietnamese female migrants, similarly perceived as being predominantly engaged in sex work. These assumptions resonate with images circulating and rules adopted in other settings and reflect growing societal anxieties over sexual tourism, trans-boundary sex work and trafficking for sexual purposes (Agustín, 2007; Kempadoo & Doezema, 1998; Kotiswaran, 2011).

Similar dynamics were noted elsewhere. In the case of the Philippines, many men migrate as sailors while women move to become domestic workers, nurses, teachers or entertainers and sex workers, and whenever these outflows are regulated by contract, the rules are embedded in gender norms. For example, in the case of Indonesia the bulk of international migration corresponds to state contracts with Gulf countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, involving young females sought for domestic work; other countries in Asia, such as India or Pakistan, export male construction workers to the Gulf area. In terms of gender and sex disciplining, as Malu Marin remarked in the paper she presented at the Interregional Dialogue in 2011:

There are countries that have strict rules concerning marriage, e.g. in Singapore: a migrant domestic worker will need approval from authorities to enable her to marry a Singaporean national. Singapore also requires mandatory pregnancy and HIV testing every six months for domestic workers and, if found positive, they are summarily deported. In some countries, women migrant domestic workers are subjected to forced sterilization, often without their knowledge. Gulf State countries also impose a no-pregnancy rule and deport on the basis of HIV status. In these countries, unmarried people (especially migrants) are forbidden to have sexual relations. There are strict rules against cross-dressing, and while this applies to both nationals and foreigners, migrant workers can get targeted and singled out, the
unspoken context being, almost everywhere, that the sexuality and sexual behaviors of migrants constitute threats either to the public order or to public health. (Marin, 2011, p. 8)

These examples from Asia suggest that receiving countries see migrants as having “sexual lives” only when it serves the country’s needs, as in the case of “marriage migration”, or when the migrants are constructed as a moral threat or public health risk, as with the strict restrictions on HIV status imposed by practically all countries in the region, or the restrictions imposed on those engaged in or perceived to engage in sex work.

In the case of Mexican contract workers in Canada, Becerril underscored the decidedly gendered nature of this migration (with 70 percent of laborers being male), as well as the profound gender and sexual biases instituted by the inter-state agreement and strict rules by employers. These migrants remain in Canada several weeks of every year, during which they are subject to strict disciplinary tactics, including rules for dating, surveillance video cameras in dorms and even tight regulation of spaces for socializing. Becerril reports an episode of compulsory pregnancy testing of female migrants conducted by Mexican consular authorities, with those women found pregnant excluded from the Programa de Trabajadores Agrícolas Temporales – PTAT. Employers’ disciplinary norms are particularly stringent with respect to sexual or affective relations between locals and migrants, and violations of these rules may mean automatic deportation. Becerril reported the case of a Canadian male employer who had an affair with a Mexican female worker. His wife denounced the affair to the state authorities that regulate the PTAT and the laborer was immediately deported; the husband committed suicide a few weeks later. Not surprisingly, women and gender-nonconforming persons generally encounter tighter restrictions on their behavior, and their rights are more easily violated because of the moral standards of employers and sexist, heteronormative and transphobic norms in migrant communities. These biases are at play in the workplace but also in spaces for socializing and partying among Canadians as well as Mexicans.
Among the most striking insights emerging from these conversations is that, despite strict regulations, extreme forms of disciplining and systematic rights violations by the state and private actors, migrants resist these tactics of control in all ways possible. In Asia, though their bodies are curtailed and subjected to rigid state regulations, migrants find ways to circumvent legal and social restrictions, such as recourse to fake marriage certificates or engaging in same-sex relations, seen as easier to hide from state authorities and employers, particularly in highly gender-segregated work spaces. This can be exemplified by the alarms raised by Philippine embassies in the Middle East in respect to the phenomenon of “love” or “boyfriend cases”. Apart from this, they also have to deal with complaints of abandonment filed by spouses left behind in the Philippines or cases of children born out of these fake marriages. Likewise, evidence of sexual resistance emerges in the public expression of concern by the Indonesian Consulate in Hong Kong over the growing numbers of lesbians among Indonesian domestic workers. Becerril also underlines that some Mexican migrants in Canada find ways to evade the stringent sexual norms to which they are subjected and that debates around sexuality are now part of daily conversations and struggles for better work conditions among these groups.

Notably, in addressing international mobility at both the Asian and Latin American Regional Dialogues, the topic of sex work inevitably reemerged. In Asia, debates addressed the stigmatization and othering of sex work — exemplified by the tendency in societies to view female foreigners as potential prostitutes — and the deployment of stringent anti-trafficking policies that, in recent years, are curtailing the mobility of women, particularly young women, but also of people whose gender expressions fall outside dominant gender binaries and heterosexual molds. Nor is this exclusive to Asia; young Brazilian female travelers found their entry into Europe through Spain arbitrarily restricted because migration authorities profiled them as potential sex workers. In the Leamington rural area studied by Becerril, the arrival of Canadian and Mexican seasonal laborers attracts the migration of sex workers from Toronto and Montreal. This confirms the argument of a number of authors who study the sex industry, in particular Laura Agustín (2007), who insists that it is neither
accurate nor productive to separate the analysis of global mobility from the analysis of sex work.

The political economy of sex markets

This thread leads us to the economics of the sex trade or sex industry, a theme most directly addressed by two studies presented and discussed at the Latin American Regional Dialogue. The first was the overview paper on Economics and Sexualities prepared by Ana Paula Silva (da Silva and Blanchette, 2011) examining the multilayered features and economic logic of sexual markets in Rio de Janeiro. The second was a focused ethnography of the Brazilian pornographic video industry explored by Maria Elvira Díaz-Benites (Benitez, 2011). Before charting the main insights and relevant connections of these studies, it is worth noting that soliciting or prostitution per se is not a crime in Brazil, although exploitation of persons involved in the trade is criminalized. Brazilian sexual culture is historically and internationally known for its constructed liberality and tolerance (Parker, 1999, 2009). A vibrant sex worker movement has emerged in the country in the course of democratization that has been able to begin legitimizing the idea of sex work as work (Pimenta et al., 2009). Although these features have changed since 2009 under the impact of various factors, including the growing conservatism of society and the expansion of anti-trafficking discourses and policies, they must be taken into account in the analysis that follows.

Similarly to the migration cases discussed above, these two studies, while focusing specifically on Brazil, allow us to examine how various trends associated with globalization and the global patterns briefly sketched at the beginning of this section unfold in concrete spaces, work dynamics and social relations implicated in the sex trade. In line with Piscitelli’s research on Brazilian sex workers in Spain, these studies also track the transnational features of Brazilian sex markets, services and

industries. Silva and Blanchette analysis of female prostitution in Rio shows that in 2009 the city remained the Brazilian hub of sex tourism, even when the mainstream media and anti-prostitution voices insisted on depicting the Northeast region as the principal pole attracting male clients.\textsuperscript{17} The findings of their previous studies investigating sex tourism websites — and interviewing foreign male tourists searching for sexual services in the city — showed that in some areas of town the trade sharply fluctuates with the tourist seasons (da Silva e Blanchette, 2005). Most notably, they reveal that in the Rio geography of prostitution there are sharp distinctions between locations that provide services to foreigners and to locals.

Díaz-Benites, whose study mapped the location of Brazilian pornographic video production within a global industry dominated by US-based companies, remarks that the insertion of Brazilian production into the global pornographic markets is achieved mainly through films featuring \textit{travestis}, or what is known as “bizarre” pornography. The videos featuring heterosexual and gay intercourse are largely consumed domestically and face sharp competition from both imported (mostly pirated) materials and, more recently, the Internet.

As in the analyses of global migration previously addressed, another area where these two studies sharply illustrate global trends involves the complexities, paradoxes and shifting dynamics that reproduce and rearticulate social inequalities. The da Silva and Blanchette study starts by situating female prostitution, or women’s choice to provide sex services in Rio, in the context of the gendered inequalities that still characterize the Brazilian labor market. Citing Alves and Corrêa (2009), they underscore that girls and women are rapidly surpassing boys and men in levels of education and that female labor participation jumped from 18 to 60 percent between 1950 and 2010. Yet

\textsuperscript{17} This may have changed since the dialogue presentation, under the impact of urban cleansing policies adopted in preparation for the 2014 and 2016 mega events (World Cup and Olympics). These policies led to the closure of a key location for sex work in Copacabana, the Help Club, and periodic police operations against saunas as well as more constant harassment of street walkers.
male-female wage gaps have remained stable since the 1990s, with women receiving on average roughly 30 percent less than men. Moreover, women’s labor remains highly segregated in typically female occupations, often concentrated at the lower end of the service sector, and the problem of reconciling work and domestic responsibilities remains unresolved because of the lack of support services and male sharing of housework. Finally, significant inequalities in wages and income exist among women workers based on race, ethnicity and region of origin.

The women interviewed by da Silva and Blanchette expressed these realities in their own terms when discussing their experiences in the labor market and their motivations for being in the sex trade. They usually referred to three emblematic female “jobs” as part of their past working experiences: being a wife, a domestic servant, and a supermarket cashier. Being a house wife often implies lack of economic and personal autonomy, whereas the two other occupations mentioned are not valued and remain low paid (minimum wage of US$2.50 per hour in 2009). The majority of interviewees quite frankly said that providing sex services gives them greater autonomy (than being wives) and pays better than jobs in domestic work, supermarkets, or retail. Most of them mentioned the advantage of flexible work hours, which permits a balance between home and labor responsibilities, particularly for those with children. The appeal of higher earnings is not exclusive to female workers at the low end of the labor market pyramid. One of the women interviewed had left a job as a real estate agent to provide sex services in a middle range “private place” (these places are known as privés) because it was more advantageous in financial terms. Even a sex worker who provides the cheapest services could earn a minimum wage when providing 30–35 ten-minute sexual services per month.

Finally, the sexual market in which these women have opted to work is no less marked by inequality than the wider labor market. The study’s geography of Rio’s sexual market identified 274 points of prostitution and more than 60 phone or virtual venues, facilitating access to sexual services classified into 21 different modalities: elite call-girls/escorts, spas, massage parlors, privés, peep
shows, cinemas, brothels, street walking strolls, bars, nightclubs, beach points, swing clubs, occasional amateur sexual services, services provided by hotels, and “programs,” which also vary between the “all night” jobs, the “girlfriend experiences” and the “fast fuck.” This is an extremely heterogeneous and unequal landscape that deconstructs the classical sociological account enshrined in the literature, which has usually divided Brazilian prostitutes into “low, medium and high class sex workers”. This heterogeneity implies huge variations in earnings. At one end, women working in high-class *prívés* can earn over US$2000 a month, while at the lower end those working in downtown “fast fucking” places earn US$10 for a ten-minute “trick,” requiring roughly 30 “tricks” per month to earn a minimum wage (US$320). Between these extremes, the price charged by street walkers working in the South Zone of the city could range between US$30–50 per hour and US$100 for a full night.

Díaz-Benites’s (2011) ethnography of the pornographic industry also strikingly illustrates the disparities and asymmetries of this particular labor market, in this case directly related to gender and sexual markers, bodies, perforativity and the ability to adhere to what managers consider proper workplace behavior. If, on the one hand, young women are highly valued, because they are the main “sellers” of heterosexual pornography, on the other, they are also easily replaceable because the audience wants “new faces and bodies”. In contrast, heterosexual males are less prone to be evicted if they are good performers (can sustain erections). If these heterosexual men may appear to be at the top of the labor hierarchy, gay men, *travestis*, and in particular those performing “bizarre” pornography, fit in the lower echelons of a hierarchy that is not dissimilar to the “charmed

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18 While the authors also note that there is no tangible evidence indicating that cheaper prostitution is inherently violent or degrading, their study confirms the hypothesis raised by others that confined prostitution at the lower end of the trade leaves women more prone to violations and abuses, while autonomous or freelance prostitutes — either street walkers or those offering services in self-organized *prívés* — are more able to negotiate prices and are subject to less coercion. This does not imply, however, that women working in middle-range and high class saunas may not also be subjected to forms of coercion, such as compulsory AIDS testing or even, sometimes, client violence.
circle" of sexuality conceived by Rubin (1984). This hierarchy translates directly into wages and other benefits. In Díaz-Benites’s own words:

The local sex market responds to the demands of the global market and the heterogeneity of the expectations amongst its consumers. Moreover, analyzing the production of porn films allows us to glimpse into the morality games at work in these networks, which can be read as an effect of the economic dynamics underneath this universe: the “best” bodies earn higher wages and can engage in illegitimate or stigmatized [sexual] performances, in contrast to “abject” bodies — *travestis*, the obese, dwarves receive lower payments and are engaged in “perversion” representations, that cause a combination of laughter, excitement and disgust, even amongst people working in the pornographic industry. To think about porn from an economic perspective, at least in Brazil, is to think of quickly replaceable bodies that easily become obsolete and of labor patterns characterized by the same flexibility found in sex markets more broadly. (Díaz- Benites, 2011, p. 274)

Both studies also compellingly illustrate Tomlinson’s (2007, 2008) suggestive notion of “fast capitalism” in that they analyze contexts and relations highly determined by the vertiginous circulation of money, the acceleration of time, a continuous rotation or replacement of the labor force, and short cycles of production. This is epitomized by the “fast fuck” locales of downtown Rio as well as by Díaz-Benites’s description of how a video is produced in one day to reduce location and labor costs.

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19 Rubin (1984) describes how ‘sex hierarchy’ operates, at least in Western societies, in ways that overlap but are also distinct from the “gender hierarchy.” At one end of this continuum we find a “good,” “natural,” or “normal” sexuality that is reproductive, monogamous, marital, non-commercial, and heterosexual and recognized as acceptable by medical, religious, and political power; this is the conventional gender order that subordinates women, if not in all, then in many domains of life. At the other end, at the bottom of the sex hierarchy, lie other sexual practices defined as “evil,” “unnatural,” or “abnormal” sexual practices. In Rubin’s words: “Bad sex may be homosexual, unmarried, promiscuous, non-procreative, or commercial. It may be masturbatory or take place at orgies, may be casual, may cross generational lines, and may take place in ‘public’, or at least in the bushes or the baths. It may involve the use of pornography sex toys or unusual roles” (p. 282).
The discussions around sexual markets, the sex industry and sex work at the Rio Dialogue inevitably revealed divergent views among participants. Gabriela Leite, the internationally known leader of the movement of prostitutes in Brazil,\textsuperscript{20} sparked the discussions, emphasizing that, in thinking about economics in relation to prostitution, we should not restrict the analysis to a monetized or pecuniary logic. In her view, the monetary aspects or gains are only one dimension of prostitution. Borrowing from Deleuze and Guattari (1977) terminology she emphasized that this domain of life is also to be understood as pertaining to the “economy of desires,” that cannot be separated from the contemporary landscape of subjective construction and sexual politics. In contrast, Corina Rodríguez, an Argentinian feminist economist who commented on the overview paper by Blanchette and Silva, questioned their argument that sex work was ultimately a choice that must be respected, drawing on feminist critiques that interrogate assumptions about rational choice in classical economics by underscoring the structural constraints that to varying degrees shape and limit our choices, economic preferences, and desires. She underlined that the automatic equation of work in prostitution with other forms of female work is not wise because of the peculiarities of sex work, a labor activity portrayed by dominant discourses as marginal or on the fringes of society and consequently subject to high levels of stigma, physical violence and other specific forms of exploitation. Although the level of earnings, autonomy and flexibility of the work offer obvious advantages, prostitutes can experience extreme situations of insecurity, vulnerability and exploitation. Above all, as workers, they lack labor rights and are not protected by existing public policies that benefit other sectors of the female labor force.

Similarly underlining the constraints that shape the option to enter sex work, Lohana Berkins, President

\textsuperscript{20} Gabriela Leite, who passed away October 10, 2013, was the coordinator of the NGO Davida, a founding member of the Network of Brazilian Prostitutes and the creator of the fashion label DASPU in 2009 as a cultural strategy to make sex workers’ political demands visible. For more on Gabriela Leite and DASPU, see Laura Murray’s film, “Um Beijo para Gabriela/A Kiss for Gabriela” (www.umbeijoparagabriela.com).
of the Association of Struggle for Travesti and Transsexual Identity of Argentina (ALITT), expressed outright opposition to the view of prostitution as a form of work similar to other occupations. Berkins underscored significant differences between the conditions experienced in the sex industry by cisgender women, when compared to transvestites and transsexuals, for whom prostitution is often the only alternative for economic survival. For that reason, she and her organization refer to sex workers as “people in situation of prostitution”, as they consider prostitution a transitional situation in which people may live at some point in their lives but insist that “exit options” must be ensured. In her view, prostitution must be thought of as a specific form of regulation of sexuality, legitimized by society, a lucrative market from which all states, whether socialist or capitalist, benefit; whereas people in situations of prostitution do not benefit from these profits.

It is impossible to account fully for these tensions and controversies that constitute one of the thorniest, if not the most divisive of topics of contemporary sexual politics. Yet by articulating the debates that have taken place in the Rio Dialogue and the theorizing and research findings available in the vast literature on the subject, pathways can be identified to illuminate blind spots beneath the deadlocks that quite often absorb discussions around sexual markets and sex work. As the polemic in the Rio meeting fundamentally turned around the exploitative characteristics of this particular form of labor, one question to be asked is: What lies beneath the obsessive focus on the extreme and exploitative dimensions of sex work that tends to plague most discussions on the topic? To respond, it is productive to leave the sex industry temporarily aside and shift the lens back to feminist thinking and research on the gendered nature of labor markets broadly speaking.

Bedford’s (2010) analysis, for example, underlines that, since the 1970s, feminists have devoted much intellectual energy to analyzing the exclusion of women from labor markets and the patterns of inequality, discrimination and exploitation they have experienced in “modernized” workplaces. In the recent past, the work of feminist economists faced sharp reactions and resistance on the part of mainstream economics, which remained structurally informed by a paradigm that presumed
a stable sexual division of labor that essentializes men as laborers and providers and women as caretakers, responsible for social reproduction. Bedford remarks, however, that today mainstream economic discourse has moved beyond this classical position to recognize the incorporation of women into the workforce through the prism of “smart economics,” viewing women’s labor skills as resources to be harnessed by global markets.

This newer paradigm celebrates women’s labor creativity, flexibilities and adaptability but in doing so conceals the harsh realities of exploitation — or even super-exploitation of women’s work. The ideological erasure of exploitation in dominant discourses on gender and labor is decidely instrumental in the context of intensified and fast capitalism. While the geography and modalities of extreme and gendered forms of exploitation have shifted, they cannot be said to have disappeared, although companies and states prefer that they remain invisible. Notably, this obfuscation of gendered exploitation and inequality in most sectors of the formal economy coincides in time with the overwhelming production and circulation of discourses collapsing prostitution, trafficking and sexual exploitation, often equating prostitution to slavery (Kempadoo, 2005; Kempadoo & Doezema, 1998; Blanchette & Silva, 2012). One key effect of this intensive production is that sexual markets and sex work have become “fetishized” as the locus par excellence of the capitalist exploitation of women: supposedly the only place where exploitation takes place in a sexualized form. To overcome this ideological obfuscation, it is useful to resort to Laura Agustín’s (2012) critical review of Sidhart Kara’s book, Sex Trafficking: Inside the Business of Modern Slavery (2009), one of the better known examples of the obliterating conflation of sex work, trafficking and exploitation. In her argument, Agustín asks the following insightful questions:

21 Smart economics also conceals other problems of labor markets and their effects: persistent gender wage gaps, the growing racial, ethnic and regional inequalities among women themselves in terms of wages, and the unresolved problem of reconciling labor and household responsibilities between women and men.
[Kara] claims that “sex slaves” are the best earners for masters because they are sold “literally thousands of times before they are replaced”… Would he do this if another service were involved, like hairdressing? If a salon owner buys a slave to be a hairdresser who then sees many customers and produces money for her owner, would Kara say the hairdresser is sold thousands of times? Or would he see that her labor is sold, albeit unjustly? Questions to be asked about both cases would include: Is money earned credited toward the payment of a debt? Does the worker enjoy free time? Does the worker accept the character of the work but want more autonomy, different working conditions, or a bigger percentage of money earned? In the case of sex businesses, workplaces are sometimes more comfortable and cleaner than in other available jobs, workers may feel safer locked in than on the streets, and they may like wearing pretty clothes, dancing, being admired. By reducing the entire world of his informants to the minutes of sex, Kara misses the big picture, whether we call it political economy, culture, or simply everyday life. (p. 1).

Agustin’s critical viewpoint implies that to continue revealing and contesting the multiple ways of exploiting women’s labor within capitalism, it is vital to undo the discursive knots now entangling sexuality, exploitation and coercion, mainly through the trope of victimized women’s bodies in prostitution. Exploitation, inequalities and vulnerabilities that characterize transactional sex and the sex industry cannot be delinked from conditions affecting millions of laborers and migrants in disorganized capitalism (Kotiswaran, 2011; Agustin, 2008; Kempadoo, 2005). It is also urgent to dig beneath the surface of the language of smart economics by considering informality, poor working conditions, low wage levels, and high levels of exploitation, including gender wage disparities and sexual harassment in the workplace.

But rather than focusing on those dimensions, dominant ideologies and discourses on sex work and trafficking converge mainly towards criminal justice approaches. Today persons are criminalized if they sell sex in most states in the US and various European countries. In Sweden and other
Nordic countries, clients are now criminalized in the name of gender equality, a model being rapidly exported to other European countries (such as Spain and France) and globally. Sex work is also a crime in many postcolonial settings, such as the majority of African countries, including South Africa, or in a number of Asian countries, such as China and Vietnam. Conversely, in most of Latin America and places like India or Thailand, the exploitation of sex work is a crime but not sex work itself. As in the case of the anti-sodomy legislation discussed earlier, this global cartography of sex work criminalization requires a systematic interrogation of the imposition of Western categories of prostitution on other cultural modalities of sexual exchange for money.

As compellingly suggested by Bernstein (2012) and others (Wacquant, 2009; Simon, 2007), contemporary carceral politics – including in relation to sex work and trafficking -- are deeply imbricated with the dominance of neoliberal market-oriented ideologies and policies that coincide with the increasing inequalities, insecurities and instabilities of late capitalism. This politics usually calls for further criminalization by there converging with the securitization paradigm – which presently pervades the dominant logic of governmentality -- and adding water to add mills of carceral politics that keep expanding north and south of the Equator (Amar, 2013; Garland, 2001; Razack, 2005). Revisiting Garland, Bernstein (2012) remarks that:

An array of social dislocations common to late modernity has contributed to heightened disorder and to crime, as well as to a stark reorientation in penal trends away from social remedies and towards politically conservative versions of “expressive justice.” In the ascendant worldview that characterizes this trend, crime is not regarded as a problem of economic deprivation but rather of inadequate social controls, in which human beings are naturally inclined to commit crimes unless inhibited from doing so by social authorities. (Bernstein, 2012, p. 3)

The recognition of the conundrum in which political and cultural debates on sex work are caught
is critical for any analysis of how sexuality and economics intersect with the expanding resource to criminal justice as “social pedagogy” or a solution to social challenges that should be dealt otherwise. At the core of these complex and disquieting intersections, one pivotal element is the feminist classical trope around the structural and systemic sexual victimization of women that can be traced to the nineteenth century (Vance, 2010; Walkowitz, 1982). Mainstream feminist that are grounded in a conception of “women’s human rights” that remains confined to sexual violence and victimization is unable to more fully grasp and respond to other gendered dimensions of social, economic, and cultural life.
The charting of conceptual realities and challenges at play in the intersections between science and sexualities varied in scope and focus in the course of the dialogues. In Latin America, four papers explored this domain: a comprehensive review of critical theories on scientific knowledge production, including those examining science through the lenses of gender and sexuality (Camargo et al., 2011); a short analysis looking into the sexed meanings and sexing effects of scientific paradigms and methods in the diagnosis of transexuality and intersexuality (Jorge, 2011); and two other essays examining the contradictory and intertwining distinctions between sexuality (or sexual politics) and scientific paradigms and practices in the realms of sexology and of HIV and AIDS (Cáceres, 2011; Russo, 2011). In Asia, although macro-level questions such as medicalization and the links between economics and scientific production were also part of the conversation, the central focus was on technologies, or the social and political effects of scientific breakthroughs (see Ganesh, 2010; see also the chapters by Jayashree Ramakrishna and Michael Tan, in Volume I). The discussions in Africa mainly looked into the biased imprints of sexuality research paradigms and practices, including in relation to social science research (see Tamale, in Volume I), as well as addressing the limitations of scientifically driven interventions in relation to HIV/AIDS (Action Health Nigeria, 2010; Obono, 2012).

As previously mentioned the discursive deployments and disciplinary ramifications of Western breakthroughs in scientific knowledge beginning in the seventeenth century were intrinsic to the
reconfiguration of the modern state. Its logics of biopolitics and governmentality were inextricably bound up in colonial and postcolonial relations in ways that continue to influence contemporary sexual politics. But when examining this crossroads, it is important to remark that the place, meaning and power of science and technology, both in themselves and in connection with economic forces and political structures, shape present-day life worlds on a much wider and deeper scale.

Nikolas Rose’s book, *The Politics of Life Itself* (2006), provides a useful starting point for a better understanding of these scalar shifts. Rose problematizes the simplified portrayal of the early twenty-first century as the dawn of a “biotech era” and a time of new biomedical possibilities. While recognizing the new dimensions of contemporary modalities of governmentality and their relation to science, he is careful to locate present-day transformations within longer arcs of history, noting that politics has been concerned with the vitality of those who are governed for quite some time:

At the risk of simplification, one could say that the vital politics of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was a politics of health — of rates of birth and death, of diseases and epidemics … and of the vitality of those agglomerated in towns and cities. Across the first half of the twentieth century this concern with the health of the population and its quality became infused with a particular understanding of the inheritance of a biological constitution and the consequences of differential reproduction of different subpopulations; this seemed to oblige politicians in so many countries to try to manage the quality of the population, often coercively and sometimes murderously, in the name of the future of the race. But the vital politics of our century looks rather different. It is neither delimited by the poles of illness and health, nor focused on eliminating pathology to protect the destiny of the nation. Rather, it is concerned with our growing capacity to control, manage, engineer, reshape and modulate the very vital capacities of human beings as living creatures. It is, I suggest, a politics of “life itself”. (Nikolas Rose, 2006, p. 3)
Rose also remarks that while many themes of this new “politics of life itself” are familiar — as exemplified by issues of population control, debates around abortion and the beginning of life, or the tropes around sexually transmitted diseases, including HIV — others are entirely novel. In his view, the scalar breakthroughs in science and technology (especially biotech and information) of the last thirty years must be analyzed in articulation with marked shifts in the rationalities of government in key policy areas such as security, welfare and health. In his view, these shifts must be understood in their articulation with neoliberal logics and mechanisms of governmentality, which have implied a devolution and dispersion of bioregulatory functions to novel bioethical architectures. Such architectures rely particularly on the regulatory (and self-regulatory) mechanisms of private institutions, as in the case of clinical services (in areas like fertility, physical enhancement and body modification); pharmaceutical and biotech companies selling a wide variety of products (contraceptives, condoms, Viagra, and ARVs, to mention a few); as well as consumer groups and civil society organizations. Rose identifies five tendencies characterizing the new politics of life itself: molecularization, involving interventions at the level of molecular biology; optimization, involving technologies designed to “secure the best possible future” for their subjects; the proliferation of somatic expertise; new economies of vitality articulating links between markets and science; and subjectification, involving new ideas about what human beings are, extending to the concept of “biological citizenship” as a new subject of rights:

New biological and biomedical languages are beginning to make citizens in new ways in the calculations of experts and authorities. Concurrently persons and groups are also using biologically colored language to describe themselves or their political identities. But the contemporary biological citizens are located and moving at the intersection between the strictly biomedical and biotech realms and other regimes of language, information and politicization. One of them being very clearly human rights ... (Nikolas Rose, 2006, p. 140)

Rose presents emblematic cases of how these micro-political dynamics from below are proliferating
in the most diverse realms of biosociality and biopolitics, including fertility treatments, abortion and stem cell research but also enhancement technologies (e.g., cosmetic and “sex reassignment” surgeries). Debates over these issues contest scientific truth, project plural visions about the effects of science and raise interrogations about the connections among science, individual and collective experiences, politics, and capitalist economics. Although Rose’s ideas were not mentioned in the course of the dialogues, they offer a useful backdrop to keep in mind while exploring the material presented and debated in Hanoi, Rio and Lagos, which directly or indirectly touched on many of the same questions.

Science as an object of critical theory

The Latin American Dialogue is a good entry point through which to chart the various regional conversations on the vast and complex intersections of sexuality with science and technology. The overview paper written by Kenneth Camargo, Fabiola Rhoden and Carlos Cáceres began by recalling that, since the birth of Western science, in the transition from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance, its authority has progressively extended over practically all domains of culture and human life. The functioning of contemporary societies, the authors noted, is inextricably imbricated with the workings and impacts of science, both in their material expressions — as techno-scientific products present in almost every space of daily life — and in terms of their symbolic meanings, as a basis for reliable knowledge or a primordial source of “truth”. This historic shift and the reconfigurations of governmentality that ensued had multiple structural implications for sexuality, gender and reproduction because, as Foucault (1978) and many others have insisted, they centered on “sex” as a pivot articulating the individual and the species, bodies and state politics. Darwin’s theories on sexed reproduction and the evolution of the species, in *The Origin of Species* (1859) and *The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex* (1871), provided the basis for a “science of sex”.
As Jane Russo (2011) observed in her essay on sexology and its effects on sexual politics, presented at the Latin American Dialogue, early sexology was crafted to contest repressive religious doctrines on sexual behavior and most principally to argue in scientific terms against the criminalization of same-sex relations in the German Penal Code of 1871 (see also Corrêa, Petchesky, & Parker, 2008; Bozon & Leridon, 1996; Weeks, 1985, 2000). She usefully notes therefore that, in those early days, there was much overlap and convergence between the “science of sex,” mostly defined in biological and biomedical terms, and sexual politics, involving public efforts and social mobilization aimed at reforming sexual regulations. The most compelling illustration of this intertwining is found in the life and work of Magnus Hirshfeld, one of the “inventors of homosexuality”, himself a doctor and a radical sexual reformer who would become an important target of Nazism in the 1930s.

But as we know, the new science also legitimated the modern idea of a universal human sexual instinct that could explain all desires, behaviors and identities, regardless of place and time. The sexual categories and taxonomies it defined generated a hierarchy of sexual identities and practices, placing reproductive heterosexual behavior at its top — in other words, scientifically consecrating cultural and juridical heteronormativity (Rubin, 1984). It also overlapped in dangerous ways with eugenics, whose central concern was the degeneracy of the white race and the uncontrolled reproduction of those deemed to be dangerous — the poor, non-white races, criminals and the “ unfit”.

The struggles in sexual politics since the sexual revolutions of the 1960s have been as much about sex disciplining through scientific discourses and technologies as about the state and the law. Thus the systematic critique of science and scientific endeavors, particularly in the domain of the biosciences, is a central bulwark of those struggles. With this in mind, one of the main contributions

22 The legacies of these studies were remarkable: the Freudian sexual drive, the invention of homosexuality (Ulrichs and Hirshfeld) and the variability of sexual desires and practices of Krafft-Ebing’s Psychopathia Sexualis (Krafft-Ebing, 1939 [orig. 1886]).
of the paper by Camargo, Rhoden and Cáceres was to retrace the long cycle of “disaffection with science”. As the authors noted, secular critiques of the modern scientific paradigm have accompanied the history of science itself since the early days of the Enlightenment, when David Hume questioned the assumptions of objectivity and inductive logic of scientific thought. The paper provides a detailed chronology of critical theory of science in the twentieth century, reminding us that it did not originate from societal contestation but as an effect of the crisis of scientific certainty that followed the debates around the general theory of relativity and the findings of quantum physics. Twentieth-century discontent starts with the logical positivists of the 1920s, later to include Karl Popper (1989), Thomas Kuhn (1962), and contemporary “science studies”.

With respect to Kuhn’s vision the authors appraise the publication in 1962 of the first version of *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* as a turning point in critical theory of science. This is so because, first, for Kuhn, the knowing subject is not the individual scientist but communities of researchers whose extra-cognitive profiles influence research methods and results; and second, because after Kuhn the history of science is no longer understood as a continuous accumulation that is always growing, but rather as a succession of crises and revolutions. From Kuhn onward, the proposition that a single criterion of demarcation should be applied to all sciences became obsolete, with clear implications for the ongoing tensions and debates around “hard” versus “soft” sciences.

To define the scope and the project of contemporary *science studies*, the authors draw on the work of Bruno Latour, who is one of the leading authors in this field: “Science studies is the English word … [But] whatever the label, the question at stake is to retie the Gordian knot, as many times as necessary, to overcome the gap that separates exact knowledge, the exercise of power, nature and culture”. (Latour, 1994, pp. 8–9). The merit of this historical recapturing and epistemological mapping is to remind us that the discontent with science has much broader contours than the field of sexual and gender politics; within it there are various streams that conceive science and scientific discourse as social constructions — contingent and traversed by power, economic effects
and the situatedness of the subjects who produce it (see also Latour & Callon, 1991).

In other words, these intellectual efforts in the wider field of science studies converge, in epistemological terms, with theories of gender and sexuality informed by social constructionism, postmodernism, or symbolic interactionism. While acknowledging the political relevance of critical theory of the history of science, Camargo and co-authors caution, however, against easy recourse to simplistic “radical” critiques that reduce scientific knowledge to mere ideology. In their view, the necessary recognition of the “structural impurities” of science should not entirely invalidate its premises. Citing the feminist theorist Donna Haraway (1988, 2004), they argue that even while recognizing that the production of scientific knowledge is always partial and situated, we should not entirely abandon the possibility of greater objectivity. In their view, these critiques should motivate the increased social responsibility of science theorists and practitioners. Scientific endeavors, in their various manifestations, should be subject to self-critical reflection about their potentially detrimental impact on people’s lives. Practitioners must establish channels of communication with society, particularly with those most affected by their work, to enable prudent knowledge for the enhancement of a good life for all (dos Santos, 1989). As we know, however, this is much more easily said than done. It is precisely at this crossroads that the struggles for biological citizenship analyzed by Rose have been proliferating in recent decades.

When examining specifically the critical conceptual lenses of gender and sexuality in relation to the biases and effects of science, the Latin American overview paper starts by revisiting the trajectory of feminism in this domain. Based on the work of Sandra Harding (1986), it distinguishes three different currents of thought: 1) feminist empiricism that agrees with the scientific project but criticizes the effects of androcentrism, characterizing it as bad science; 2) a feminist standpoint that advocates for the production of scientific knowledge based on women’s experience; 3) postmodern feminist approaches that wrestle directly with the epistemological foundations of science, identifying the heteronormative and androcentric assumptions always underlying the apparent neutrality and
objectivity of research and scientific reasoning.

The Latin American overview paper calls attention to the fact that this third stream, while including thinkers from other disciplines, is largely formed by feminists who are themselves scientists (generally biologists), as in the case of Ruth Hubbard (1997), Donna Haraway (1988, 2004) and Anne Fausto-Sterling (2000). These authors interrogate scientific assumptions and conclusions about gender and sexuality, not from outside but from within the scientific realm, contesting both the essentialism of hard sciences and the conceptions of the social sciences, including feminist theorizing and research. For example, these authors have sharply challenged the binary logic that characterizes the classic feminist perspective on sex and gender, in which the first corresponds to biology and the second to the cultural layer that transforms organic material in social practice. Citing Anne Fausto-Sterling (2000), the paper emphasizes the limitations of simplistic and binary logics that conceive biology and culture in terms of layers. Far from forming either an opposition or an “inside” (biological) layer and an “outside” (cultural) surface, the lived world of bio-existence and social relations is one of constant and complex interaction and symbiosis. In order to capture more precisely the overlaps and disconnections between nature and culture, both natural and social science frames must be complexified.

In relation specifically to scientific discourse on sexuality, the paper returns to Foucault and Jeffrey Weeks as fundamental references to understand the historicity, complexity and depth of connections between science, sexuality and politics in the contemporary era. In addition, it examines the contributions of symbolic interactionism, social psychology and cultural studies (cultural scenarios and scripts) to constructivist perspectives on sexuality. Finally, the authors recognize the indisputable contributions of queer theory to contemporary studies of sexuality, particularly in its critiques of the heteronormative order and its resonance with feminist theorizing on binary thinking about gender and sexuality (Butler, 1990; 1994; Sedwick, 1990).
Science and Technology

The scientific and technological revolutions underway since the 1970s not only constitute one of the main forces driving economic globalization (Sen, 1997; see above); they have also had profound effects on sexual cultures and identities. Of course this is not an entirely new phenomenon, as technological changes, most often linked to major economic shifts, have long had a major impact on key aspects of sexuality. For example, John D’Emilio’s by now classic analysis in his article, “Capitalism and Gay Identity” (1983), examines how the industrial revolution and the shift from domestic household production to industrial capitalist development provided the conditions for gay and lesbian identities and communities to begin to emerge. By drawing both men and women out of households and into the market, industrial capitalist development began to pull the rug out from under the “traditional” heterosexual family as the key unit of economic production and began to place new emphasis on the sale of individual labor power as the key to economic exchange. This, in turn, was linked to the transformation of the family from the site of economic production to the location for emotional security and affection. It also contributed to a steady decline in birth rates, as procreation gradually became disconnected from sexual pleasure as the key feature of sexual life. As preindustrial modes of economic production gave way to industrial technological development, associated patterns of urbanization created a fundamentally new set of social, cultural, economic and political contexts in which men and women attracted to their own sex could begin to fashion a new identity and way of life based on their sexual feelings. These changes simultaneously began to open up new options for heterosexual women as well, who also found new possibilities for greater independence and sexual freedom within the context of the evolving industrial capitalist economy (D’Emilio & Freedman, 1988). While their impact was first felt as a result of the industrial revolution that took place in Europe and North America, over time the changes would gradually extend across the so-called “developing world” in the global South as well, though often through a process that reflected many aspects of the technological and economic dependence that characterized late-
sexuality and politics: regional dialogues from the global south

Just as technological change, linked to economic transformations, has had a broad impact on the changing history of sexuality globally, it has taken on special importance under conditions of increasingly rapid globalization — conditions both stimulated by (and stimulating) rapidly changing communications and media technologies. It is clear that the whole issue of technology and technological innovation as they relate to sexuality, sexual identity and sexual health constitutes especially rich ground in need of both conceptual elaboration and empirical research. As Lenore Manderson has argued in an important edited volume that was inspired by discussions at the Asian Regional Dialogue in Hanoi (Manderson, 2012), technologies shape sex and sexuality in powerful ways, affecting perceptions, behaviors and relationships. They are not simply things or artifacts but dynamic processes, practices and institutional arrangements:

The technologies that shape sex, identity and sexual health are extensive. They include increasingly globalised items, such as pharmaceuticals for contraception, conception and sexual function. They include also the sexual practices and health outcomes that are made possible or that transpire as a result. They include too the expanded and increasingly globalised clinical environment that operates — with its own multiple technologies — to assist in reproduction and in aligning bodies and sexual and gender identity. And they include the materials and practices incorporated into people’s everyday lives for pleasure and symbolic and functional purpose. Initiation and bodily embellishment are one example of how products and practices meet; adult shops and clubs are another. The term technology works, too, to describe behavior … [as in the case of] sexual violence as a technology of power … Consequently, a technology of sexuality is as tangible and as mundane as a condom, as tawdry and as fanciful as edible underwear, yet as elusive, immaterial but equally manifest, as an ideology of sexuality, or the threat of assault that informs the gendered and heterosexist use of space. (Lenore Manderson, 2012, pp. 1–2)
What is perhaps most striking, however, about this remarkable technological complexity, is the way in which it can serve a wide range of different ends. On the one hand, it is central to the many ways in which sex and sexuality become commoditized in the early twenty-first century, especially through the influence of the Internet. Markets are produced for sexual services, of course, but also for sexual products of diverse types, for the enhancement of sexual performance, for the treatment of sexually transmitted infections, and a range of other technologies that might have been unimaginable just a few years ago. Indeed, it is almost impossible to overstate the extent to which the flows of images and ideas that are associated with both globalization and the information age, in turn made possible through the flows of technology that Appadurai described as *technoscapes* (Appadurai, 1996), have transformed the imagination of sexual possibilities, making sexuality one of the major fields of meaning and power in which the effects of globalization have been manifest.

Against this backdrop, it is also worth considering the discussion at the Asian Dialogue on how the development and dissemination of new information and communication technologies (ICTs) are simultaneously transforming sexualities and restructuring the boundaries between public and private and, potentially, political debate. In his presentation at the Asian Dialogue (included in Volume I) the anthropologist Michael Tan, from the University of the Philippines, described how new ICTs are transforming the structures of public spheres in Asian societies. In particular, Tan recognized the various ways in which e-commerce, widespread access to cell phones and social networking sites, among other innovations, have transformed sexual landscapes and created arenas for people to “[build] identities around gender and sexuality”. These changes have in some instances given rise to new “subaltern counterpublics”, communities that produce alternative understandings of identity and justice, which are subsequently introduced into national public debates (Fraser, 1990). In this respect, they have the potential to become spaces of resistance for excluded groups. Even in the context of China, where the Internet is heavily monitored, as Cai Yiping observed at the Interregional Dialogue, it has become “the most democratic space” in the country, with “debates underway about a wide range of issues related to sexuality, ranging from the gender based violence to LGBT rights,
prostitution, [and] commercial sex work, among others”. 23

Along similar lines, also at the Asian Dialogue, Indira Maya Ganesh (Ganesh, 2010) discussed the impact of cell phones on the possibilities for social and sexual interaction of kothis in Mumbai, India. Kothi, she explained, is an identity adopted by both working and middle class “biological males representing a shifting space of femininities.” Drawing on ethnographic research, Ganesh noted how cell phones can become status markers that facilitate social and sexual interactions across class lines as well as opening possibilities for a kind of “mobile citizenship”: “Mobility has particular resonance for kothis. Kothis’ traversing multiple subjectivities closely mirrors the kind of movement that mobile telephony allows. This sort of mobility between subjectivities and places implies a kind of statelessness, a sense of being free-floating and unhindered by boundaries and borders, and therefore, laws”. Ganesh’s observations are notable in part because they speak to the uses of new technologies by economically marginalized sectors of society. In this respect, they challenge understandings that map dichotomies between local and global unproblematically across class lines, equating cultural globalization with elite cosmopolitanism. Yet Ganesh further notes that the possibilities opened by cell phones are not entirely rosy, pointing, for example, to the new dangers they pose for possible surveillance and blackmail (particularly in the present context of the country’s criminalization of sodomy, re instituted by the Indian Supreme Court in 2013).

Moreover, as Tan further argued in his presentation, new technologies can reinforce as well as undercut underlying class disparities, depending in part on the technology in question. Hence, while cell phones have been widely disseminated, access to Internet through computers in the global

South remains quite skewed (International Telecommunication Union, 2014). More generally, in the discussions at the Asian Dialogue, some participants pointed out that while new technologies can create opportunities for individuals, they do not necessarily challenge larger social structures. In this regard, for example, they noted how on-line communities may create an illusion of an off-line community, once again distorted by the parameters of who has access (extending classical critiques of the democratic public sphere noted earlier). In some countries (and transnationally, we might add) gay and lesbian groups may have an enormous on-line presence but no off-line reality, giving rise to “technological ghettoes”.

These scalar technological innovations in communication have definitely opened new possibilities for political resistance and democratic engagement as sharply illustrated by the research findings of the global exploratory EroTICS research project (sm Kee, 2011). The study mapped how the web is helping Indian young women learn about sex and gain autonomy and becoming a source of exchange and information for trans people in South Africa. It analyzed the Internet as a key political mobilizing tool used by LGBT people in Lebanon and examined the complex micro-political dynamics of how dissident sexualities are manifest and performed on the Brazilian web. Yet the same findings also detected expanding trends of state censorship and forms of vigilantism, quite often triggered by sexuality-based moral panics. Moreover, the possibilities opened by the Internet for a politics of resistance in sexual matters are inevitably in tension with the consumerist culture that also pervades the web, whose effects could be decidedly depoliticizing.

24 In its 2012 Report Measuring the Information Society the International Communication Unit informs that between 2001 and 2011 the worldwide number of cell phone users rose from 18 to 85 percent. Meanwhile household broadband subscriptions increased from 10 to 34 percent. In the global South, users of cell phones jumped from 10 to 78 percent of the population, while the percentage of households with broadband Internet connections increased from zero to 8 percent.
The *corpus sexualis* of science

The essay written by Juan Carlos Jorge (2011), from the University of Puerto Rico, presented and discussed in Rio, compellingly illustrates how biomedical scientific paradigms translate into medical practices, social representations and violations of bodily integrity. According to Jorge, since 1910, when chromosomes were discovered, the male/female binary has been deeply imprinted onto the scientific criteria and parameters used to determine people’s sexual identity, with the formula 46 XX and 46 XY. In the course of the twentieth century, gonad tissue studies and neural research on brain functioning compounded these early genetic studies and definitions, deepening and expanding the binary imprint of sexed bodies and gender identity in biomedical mindsets, methodological frames and practices.

Jorge’s essay, however, also reports that research in the last few decades, informed by molecular biology and new methods of investigation, is revealing that processes of sexual differentiation in humans are much more complex and variable across the life cycle than what is proposed by dominant scientific paradigms. Or, in the words of the Portuguese embryologist Clara Pinto-Correia, “Sex determination in mammals remains a giant and unresolved puzzle” (Pinto-Correia, 1997, p. 261). Scientific evidence, even collected within the biomedical paradigm, now raises questions about the foundational notion that a female is just absence of what produces a male or that female becoming is a passive biological process (Manolakau et al., 2006). Yet, Jorge observes, these findings have not reached any textbook of medicine or molecular biology, much less the mainstream media. This last observation on the media is very important, as Paula Machado noted in her comments on the session on sexuality and science at the Latin American Dialogue, because of the ways in which both scientific and popular media address, interpret and disseminate research findings on the sexual body, never incorporate incorporating critical views on the subject such as the ones biologists like Anne Fausto-Sterling or even Stephen Jay Gould have developed.
In Machado’s view, the scientific understandings of sex and gender as biological binary imprints, critically analyzed by Jorge, constitute scientifically grounded “passports to reality” associated with ideas of progress, advancement, development and welfare: in short, conceptions of “modernization” that remain compelling everywhere, including the global South (see de la Dehesa and Pecheny in Volume I). These “passports to reality” do not remain confined in labs and clinical settings. They have powerful political impacts, as they circulate intensively in public spheres, including through the media, and contribute to shape the rationales for laws and public policies. This is particularly evident in regard to public policies determining access to and criteria and practices of medical interventions concerning transgender and intersexual health and legal status, for example the requirement of psychiatric diagnosis or sterilization as a prerequisite of sex reassignment procedures for trans persons. Even when these assumptions do not translate into juridical statutes but remain confined to medical protocols, they have political consequences in that they determine how the state apparatus will recognize a person as an embodied citizen or, more importantly, may violate his/her fundamental rights in the name of science. The most glaring example here is the widespread recourse, across the most diverse cultures, to surgical interventions aimed at correcting the perceived sex/gender imperfections of intersex children. Jorge’s essay recaptures the tragic story of one such intervention:

Last year we have published the case of a person with congenital adrenal hyperplasia (Jorge et al. 2008). The clinical algorithm for this form of intersexuality defines that intervention should occur early in development of children to prevent masculinization not only in terms of corporeal intelligibility but in psychic terms. The doctors in charge followed the clinical protocol proposed by the American Academy of Pediatrics. They measured the phallus, established the karyotype profile, tried to determine [sexual] identity of the gonad, and measured the hormones. Doctors have read the “sex” of the person, and Juan was “made intelligible” as a female even though he identifies himself and continues to live as a male. The biomedical knowledge created Juan out of Ana by assembling pieces of the “sexual
Not surprisingly, political struggles in relation to the pathologization of intersexuality and systematic violations of human rights resulting from the biomedical management of intersex children’s bodies today constitute one of the most heated zones of biological citizenship battles. These battles range from micro-level contestations to debates about clinical protocols and processes of legal reforms. The societal mobilization that led to passage of the Argentine Gender Identity Law in 2012, for example, demonstrates that activist movements can resist and transform dominant biopolitical practices through a combination of political action, bottom-up consensus building and insistence on human rights premises and arguments.25 Internationally, such efforts have extended to initiatives aimed at reframing existing biomedical protocols in the International Classification of Diseases of the World Health Organization and the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of the American Psychiatric Association, calling for de-pathologization of sexual and gender categories and procedures.

These efforts involve biomedical researchers and practitioners as well as the persons whose bodies and lives have been subjected under these protocols. In some cases they are bound to participatory frames designed to rebalance north–south disparities, often flagrant in the context of global struggles around biological citizenship.26 Such initiatives are quite significant in light of what Jorge and other participants of the Latin American Dialogue analyzed as the geopolitics of the “scientific corpus sexualis”, marked by the hegemony of scientific institutions based in the global North, particularly US-based organizations such as the American Association of Pediatrics and the

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25 The Argentinian Gender identity law enables persons to change their name and gender on official documents such as birth certificates and access to required health care without a psychiatric diagnosis. This conceptual and political frame does not rely on victimization, avoids the gender binary, and opens the possibility for the law to recognize the “shifting nature of sexual identities”.

26 One example is the global initiative coordinated by GATE — Global Action for Trans Equality — to establish a critical platform to intervene in the revision of the International Classification of Diseases, while balancing power differentials between North and South (see http://transactivists.org/trans).
American Psychiatric Association, whose research and clinical management protocols are adopted worldwide without much questioning.27

The dialogues, however, also revealed that these analyses, concerns and obstacles are not specific to research and clinical practices related to gender identity, transexuality and intersexuality. Rather, they are easily identifiable in many other quarters of sexual health and rights, arguably falling under the umbrella of a globalized “medicalization”.

“Medicalization” and beyond

Camargo and his co-authors argue that we must always scrutinize the problem of medicalization in its complex connections with the global political economy of health and biomedicine. Economic interests fabricate diseases and define them to include greater numbers in order to increase the market for certain pharmaceutical products (Cassels & Moynihan, 2005, Conrad, 2007), and the companies and research institutes responsible for their creation and promotion are overwhelmingly based in the global North. The paper also distinguishes globalized medicalization from what some authors portray as medical imperialism, which, in addition to economic dominance and interests, also encompasses the prescriptive, exclusionary and disciplinary elements of “medical order”. These insights from the Latin American meeting echoed debates that had taken place a few months earlier in Hanoi, for example Ramakrishna’s analysis that:

27 In relation to this particular challenge Jorge proposes a multipronged and long-term agenda of research and political mobilizing that is worth sharing. It includes: a) the documentation of global (vertical and horizontal) exchange of scientists, especially in the disciplines of psychiatry and clinical psychology, involved in research on transexuality and intersexuality; b) study of the geopolitical agendas of governments and multinational companies as well as of the political economy of credit and financing of scientific research in these realms; c) a critical statistical system to monitor and contrast transnational data on the incidence and prevalence of gender identity and health issues; d) the global mapping of medical and legal management of sexualities worldwide; and e) mechanisms to facilitate the dissemination of this information and other knowledge among experts and activists of all genders and sexualities.
Medicalization, has been a major intellectual trend of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Increasingly medical and biomedical modes of thought dominate the discourse on sexuality, and medical authority over many domains that were hitherto considered social conditions or life experience, is unquestioned … This medicalization of society … has resulted in the transformation of the human condition into treatable disorders. This recasting of social conditions as disease in the biomedical framework has drawn attention away from the social, cultural, economic and political causes that influence these “diseases” … Medicalization is not solely due to the medical professionals. The pharmaceutical industry, biotechnology, the development of consumerism, direct advertisement to consumers, as well as insurance and government policies play a significant role (Ramakrishna, 2013, p. 165).

Ramakrishna analyzes similarities and differences in the circulation and marketing of Viagra and condoms in India, an assessment that highlights how neoliberal markets and frames of governance exacerbate medicalization’s problematic effects. In both cases, the production and distribution of these products effectively ignore local constructions of sexuality and the economic and political contexts where sex occurs. And while their portability and the discretion they offer the consumer in determining their use represent certain advantages, the technologies must also be understood as belonging to new modalities of health governance that transfer to individuals a greater share of responsibility for their own care and wellbeing.

While recognizing powerful forces driving this trend, the papers presented by Jane Russo and Carlos Cáceres at the Latin American Dialogue complicated linear accounts of medicalization by underscoring contestation within and the potential political power of biomedical fields. In this regard, Russo emphasized that while early sexology was inscribed in a biomedical paradigm, it was decidedly political, recalling that it was fundamentally a European intellectual and professional field (almost totally German) that was swept from the scientific and political scene with the rise of Nazi fascism. Second-wave sexology, in contrast, blossomed in the United States following World War II,
a geographic shift entailing significant inflections in terms of methods, approaches and objects of research. 28 While early sexology combined “clinical work” with a sexual politics of reform, American sexology in the mid-twentieth century tended to focus on heterosexuality (or, as Russo put it, “the sexuality of the normal man”) and favored quantitative methods to research sexual behavior, with Alfred Kinsey’s work being a paradigmatic example.

Despite its quantitative focus, Kinsey and his research team — who were scientists guided by both intellectual openness and life experimentation — broke through these parameters, investigating homosexual and other practices considered deviant. In the conservative political and moral climate of the 1950s, despite the uncontested popular success of Kinsey’s findings, Kinsey himself and his research institute were targeted by the House Unamerican Activities Committee, and this line of research would be suspended, with long-term detrimental impacts on sexuality research in the US (Bullough, 1994, 1998; Di Mauro, 1995).

Kinsey’s successors were William Masters and Virginia Johnson, he a gynecologist and she a psychologist, whose work further normalized sexuality research in the US by focusing on the laboratory-based study of the sexual responses of heterosexual couples. According to Russo, this second phase of US-based sexology represented a shift toward mainstreaming and de-politicization, in light of which the “first sexology” appears highly political or even radical. Under the impact of the sexual revolutions of the 1960s and 1970s, however, new forms of politicization emerged, leading to the first open societal confrontation with biomedical discourses and practices that target sexuality.

These rebellions focused primarily on the pathologization of homosexuality in psychiatric protocols and even sexology manuals. In the United States and Europe, gay and lesbian movements systematically

28 This post–Second World War blossoming was, however, preceded by less visible investments in sexuality and sexual behavior research (see Corrêa, Petchesky & Parker, 2008).
organized protests at sexology, psychology and psychiatry conferences, until homosexuality was finally eliminated from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) in 1973 and from the International Classification of Diseases (ICD) in 1990. These events would have a long-term impact on the field of sexology. By the 1990s, once again influenced by global cultural transformations, national processes of democratization, and international policy debates, the old World Association of Sexology (WAS) changed its name to World Association for Sexual Health. And in 1999, the organization adopted a Declaration of Sexual Rights, inspired by the political proposals constructed by feminist and LGBTQI movements since the 1970s. 29

This shift might be interpreted as a re-politicization of sexology, yet, as Russo noted, it took form at the same time and in tension with the development of “sexual medicine”. Having begun as a branch of urology in the 1980s, “sexual medicine experienced a scalar expansion in recent decades, particularly after the global success of drugs for erectile dysfunction”. As was also noted at the Asian Dialogue, this recent boom in sexual medicine is associated with the power and interests of the pharmaceutical industry and thus is interwoven with libertarian tropes that affirm the pursuit of sexual pleasure as a personal choice, echoing the consumer ethos advanced by neoliberal economic and cultural policies. According to Russo, the emphasis on sexual performance and behavior, already present in Masters’ and Johnson’s research and clinical work, is now taken to the extreme, by totally voiding from the picture of sexual experience and sexual pleasure the relational aspects of sexuality. Sexual medicine is revamping the “medicalization of sex” in ways that reify the centrality of intercourse and the dominance of male physiology and genitalia in the endeavors of sexual pleasure. If a repoliticization of sexology is underway, it is evolving in complex

29 It should be noted that political struggles against psychiatric sexual classifications have not ended there. A few years ago, as a new revision of the APA Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM 6) began, trans communities in different parts of the world launched a series of campaigns against the pathologization of transexuality. Furthermore, as the WHO International Classification of Diseases is also under revision, important advocacy efforts are also underway that aim at radically altering the current definitions and parameters in relation to transexuality and intersexuality, under the leadership of Global Action for Trans Equality (GATE).
articulation and at times tension with these impulses toward medicalization.

The work presented by Carlos Cáceres, “Transforming the discourse on HIV as a sexual epidemic: Paradoxes and enigmas of the global response”, also focused on tensions surrounding recent processes of medicalization. Cáceres examined the historic trajectory of the global response to HIV and AIDS, highlighting the radical changes in sexuality research priorities in recent years. He began by reminding us of the centrality of sexuality in the first two decades of the epidemic and its effects on the creation of public spaces for sexual subjects and sexual discourses to become visible. He then offered a detailed analysis of how, in the last thirty years of global and regional conferences, a wide range of political and social actors and international agencies has played distinct and sometimes contradictory roles in the construction of the global response to the epidemic. In particular, he delved into the unresolved tensions between techno-scientific biomedical approaches and social scientific approaches that have characterized research and policy debates around HIV and AIDS since the 1980s. Over the years, he notes palpable trends toward increasing medicalization and a parallel de-sexualization of discourses on and policy responses to the epidemics.

Cáceres considers the discovery of anti-retrovirals (ARVs) in the mid-1990s the first key landmark in this shift. If, on the one hand, ARVs allowed the containment of the epidemic, on the other, they also implied the gradual resurgence of biomedical approaches as the privileged response to the AIDS crisis. Since then the differences and tensions between more socially and culturally oriented and more biomedical and policy oriented strategies have deepened. Today these tensions are clearly evident in the context of debates and proposals on prevention, more specifically in relation to the new emphasis on evidence-based methods involving biomedical interventions, such as circumcision and ARV prophylaxis in the case of groups exposed to high vulnerability. According to Cáceres, the growing hegemony of the view that new biomedical technologies are the best solution to prevent HIV/AIDS has opened a dangerous path. This tendency is also convergent with what the Hanoi dialogue identified as new modalities of health governance that transfer to individuals a greater
share of responsibility for their own care.

Participants at the Latin American meeting pointed out that, by de-sexualizing HIV prevention, evidence-based methods seem to be used in policy discourses and practices as a way to deflect escalating attacks by dogmatic religious forces and other conservative sectors on open discussions of sexual practices and sexuality education for HIV prevention and condom use. At the same time, new technologies designed to reduce HIV infections also appear to have gained much appeal among some powerful institutional actors because they facilitate the “hygiene” focus of debates over prevention strategies that, in the view of these actors, became excessively overloaded with sexual meanings. Like biomedical interventions, the new evidence-based HIV prevention methods potentially conceal the social, cultural and economic contexts within which sex occurs and sexuality is located, ignoring the factors and conditions of vulnerability that may restrict people’s ability to protect themselves against infections.

The myopia of this narrow biomedical lens became evident in the analyses and discussions that took place at the African Dialogue. Bernice Heloo (2010) examined the thorny gendered, social, economic and political issues underlying the vulnerability to and unrelenting spread of HIV among African women. Although recognizing the biological factors that place women at greater risk of infection in heterosexual intercourse, she also emphasized the weight of patriarchal gender norms and prevailing social constructions of masculinity and femininity that do not leave much space for female sexual agency. These conditions are deeply connected to women’s economic dependence on men and social-cultural traditions, discourses and practices that further accentuate gender inequalities. She mentioned, for example, the restrictive role of the Christian religion, as exemplified by the Catholic Church’s prohibition of condom use, but also referred to widespread African practices, such as a wide range of sexual taboos, child and forced marriages, some initiation rites that involve cutting of the skin or organ, as in the case of FGM and spear sex (practices in certain eastern African countries), or simply the obligation for women to submit to the sexual urges of men. While
recognizing the need for methods of prevention controlled by women, such as female condoms, microbicides and pre- and post-exposure prophylaxis, Heloo and many other participants insisted that these technologies should not be regarded as silver bullets that will automatically eliminate this complex gamut of social, economic and cultural dimensions and determinants.

Neli Khuzwayo’s (2010) presentation at the African Dialogue on the failures of a Post-Exposure Prophylaxis (PEP) project of HIV prevention among rape survivors in South Africa likewise revealed the limitations of biomedical interventions that ignore the cultural contexts in which they are implemented. The program’s protocol required that, before PEP is administered, an HIV test must be conducted, the drug must be administered within 72 hours of exposure and it must be taken twice a day for 28 days. The major factor behind the program’s failure was non-adherence to prescriptions of the medication. The study reveals that only four out of sixteen rape survivors completed the medication as recommended. The explanation for the lack of adherence is the social barriers stemming from stigma and lack of support from family, community and friends. Most survivors kept the rape experience secret from their family to avoid rejection and social isolation, and consequently no social networks were formed to persuade and empower women who felt discouraged to continue taking their medication. The discussions around this failed and frustrating experiment led the participants of the dialogue in Lagos to conclude that the main problematic feature of medicalized models, such as PEP, is that they are designed and implemented as if HIV prevention occurred in a vacuum when, in fact, the life worlds in which infections occur are spaces filled with social, structural and cultural constraints.

Once again Sylvia Tamale’s paper provides sharp insights that can further illuminate the complexities, contradictions, power fluxes, political battles and resistances at work in the intersections between sexualities and scientific endeavors. Tamale lamented “a wasted decade of AIDS research that has failed to get to the bottom of the complexities of AIDS, especially among poor communities”. In fact, HIV provided the opportunity for a resurgence of colonial modes of studying sexuality in
Africa — “racist, moralistic, paternalistic and steeped in liberal thinking” (included in Volume I). While recognizing that it is crucial to sustain epistemological critiques and political contestations of biomedical paradigms and practices, Tamale strongly emphasized that social science should not be exempt from the same systematic critical scrutiny. When examined from a situated African perspective, historians, philosophers, anthropologists, sociologists, psychologists, demographers — including those who define themselves as feminists — share responsibility for the continued construction of distorted images of and assumptions about African sexualities. Among other illustrations, Tamale in her paper in the first volume of this publication scrutinized the obsession of social anthropologists and women’s rights advocates from the global North with female genital mutilation and the traces of an imperialist, colonial project in this obsession:

The bulk of approaches to the subject matter are culturally insensitive, focus narrowly on the negative aspects of female circumcision and completely overlook the multifaceted nature of the practice and the meanings attached to the rituals associated with it. Although African feminists do not condone the negative aspects of the practice, they take strong exception to the imperialist, racist and dehumanizing infantilization of African women. (Sylvia Tamale, 2013, p. 29)
The Dialogues have also addressed the complex and in some ways paradoxical relationship of sexual politics with institutionalized religion and communities of faith. As with other topics, somewhat different emphases and inflections characterized the different meetings, again reflecting both the particular regional dynamics and the professional interests of the participants and organizers. Several participants noted — and a few echoed — the widespread view that this relationship is essentially antagonistic. This perception in part responds to concrete political dynamics playing out on the ground in various countries, where the principal opponents to sexual rights are often motivated primarily by extreme or dogmatic religious beliefs. But it also reflects the roots of sexual rights in the tradition of liberalism and their common articulation with the language of secularism and laïcité. Given this entanglement with liberalism, it is not surprising that the political deployment of religious frames partially overlaps with the rights-versus-culture dichotomy highlighted at the African Regional Dialogue, discussed above, or operates in parallel ways.

At the Latin American Regional Dialogue, for example, the defense of laïcité as a political strategy sparked considerable contention, with some participants reiterating its importance, broadly affirmed by sexual rights advocates in the region, and others raising questions about its limits and potential risks. Participants at both the Latin American and African meetings countered the secularist position by underscoring the need to recognize a plurality of voices within communities of faith. At the Asian Regional Dialogue, while some participants alluded to clashes between sexual rights advocates and
recognizing religious pluralism

Both the Latin American and African Regional Dialogues highlighted the need to recognize and articulate ties with religious communities and cultivate faith-based arguments that might challenge patriarchy and heteronormativity as a priority. Indeed, questioning the presumed opposition between religion and sexual rights, participants emphasized that activists in various countries are already undertaking such efforts.

At the Latin American meeting, participants underscored the growing heterogeneity of the religious field in a region where, for example, Protestants now represent over 15 percent of the population in at least 10 countries. Against this backdrop, some noted, Afro-Latin American religions are generally more open to participants who break with dominant gender and sexual norms than Catholic and Evangelical churches (Fry, 1982; Vidal Ortiz, 2006). LGBT churches, such as the Metropolitan Community Church present in nine countries in the region, as well as the regional network of Catholics for Choice, which participates in a regional project called the Campaign against Fundamentalisms, have explored ways to articulate sexual and reproductive rights with theological discussions and within communities of faith. Since the 1970s, Latin American feminist theologians,
finding inspiration in both the feminist movement and liberation theology, have advanced critical readings of scripture that open possibilities for more egalitarian gender relations (Vélez 2001; Tomita 2010). Engaging these critical theologies in his presentation at the Dialogue, Father Elias Mayer Vergara (2011) of the Anglican Episcopal Church of Brazil also pointed to the importance of ecumenical spaces such as the Latin American Council of Churches, founded in 1982. The Council brings together 150 churches from throughout the region as spaces where “alternative visions” of sexuality can develop through dialogue across religious traditions. Indeed, even within churches with official stances against sexual and reproductive rights, the story is often more complicated than it seems. The significant gap between official Catholic doctrine and the everyday beliefs and practices of many Catholics in the region was cited as evidence of greater plurality within the Catholic Church and of the limits of the Catholic hierarchy’s official authority.

Along similar lines, in her presentation on religion and culture at the African Dialogue, the activist Asma’u Joda, of the Centre for Women and Adolescent Empowerment (Nigeria), also underscored theological currents affirming views supportive of sexual rights and feminist principles within both Christian and Islamic traditions. With regard to Islam in particular, she noted that it is “a very sexual religion” and that the Quran and the Hadiths contain extensive discussions of sexuality and numerous precepts that affirm women’s empowerment. In particular, she recalled the tradition of interpretation (*ijtihad*), which opens the possibility for multiple interpretations of doctrine. In ways that paralleled the discussions at the Latin American Regional Dialogue, Joda similarly pointed to efforts by Muslim organizations to engage these discussions, noting, for example, the Federation of Muslim Women Associations in Nigeria (FOMWAN) and GREFELS, in Senegal. Among the global and regional initiatives that Joda cited, the International Solidarity Network of Women Living Under Muslim Laws (WLUM) funded the Women and Law Project, which involved research in 18 Muslim countries and gave birth to such organizations as Baobab for Women’s Human Rights and the Centre for Women and Adolescent Empowerment in Nigeria, among others. Similarly, Musawah: The Global Movement for Equality and Justice in the Muslim Family, launched in 2009, seeks to
“[combine] the Islamic, human rights, constitutional and lived realities of women and men in our communities”. She also noted the work of the Safra Project, based in the United Kingdom, which strives “to bring out passages in the Quran and Ahadiths that recognize homosexuality and thus challenge heterosexual claims of being the sole legitimate groups within Islam,” as well as Positive Islam South Africa, which brings together Muslims living with HIV/AIDS. “Religion is indeed culture”, Joda affirmed; in keeping with the understanding of culture as a fluid terrain discussed above, she suggested that all major religious traditions “are subject to local interpretations and understandings that change from one community to another”. There “is no one way of practicing any of these religions”, Joda concluded.

The growth of dogmatic religious forces

Despite — or perhaps because of — this evidence of diversity and openness to change in certain religious circles, dominant trends in religious politics are moving in a quite different direction. Discussions at all the dialogues called attention to the growing mobilization of opposition to sexual rights and a tendency toward greater religious conservatism or even dogmatism in many countries in all three regions, very often (though by no means always) impelled by religious activists and authorities (see Freston, 2004, 2008). At the Asian Regional Dialogue, for example, Dédé Oetomo underscored this trend toward greater conservatism among religious authorities in Indonesia. Oetomo drew a contrast between state recognition of warias under the Suharto dictatorship, which was enacted in consultation with the recently created Council of Islamic Clerics, and the contemporary situation of repression and discrimination faced by warias in the province of Aceh, where Shari’a was adopted and warias are commonly harassed by local police.31 The conditions prevailing in Aceh are in part an effect of the decentralization policies adopted in the course of Indonesian

democratization since 2003 in an attempt to overcome the strong centralism of the Suharto regime (Siapno, 2011). These developments highlight the fact that there are no linear and easy correlations between the features of a political regime and state recognition and regulation of sexual identities. Indeed, they suggest that processes of formal democratic reform, while in principle opening greater political space for sexual rights advocates, can paradoxically also prove to be a double-edged sword by simultaneously strengthening opponents who can use religion to mobilize a larger political base.

Along similar lines at the African Regional Dialogue, Codou Bop, from the Groupe de Recherche sur les Femmes et les Lois au Sénégal (GREFELS), pointed out that despite the long history of acceptance of homosexuality in Senegal, a magazine report on a supposed gay wedding in 2008 prompted an unprecedented wave of homophobia that included daily media coverage of the topic. The president of an Islamist political party and a coalition of conservative Muslim organizations, motivated in part by the expectation of electoral gains, pushed this campaign (see also Bop, 2008). Once again, moves toward a formally more democratic polity paradoxically created incentives for political actors to mobilize religious and nationalist identities in opposition to sexual rights.

Participants at the Latin American Regional Dialogue explored similar trends and actually addressed the question of religion most extensively among all the dialogues. This emphasis responded in good measure to the continued political weight of the Catholic Church in most of the region’s countries, a legacy of colonialism. The Church retains its status as the official state religion in Argentina and Costa Rica and special privileges in areas like state financing or public education in several other countries (including the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Peru, Paraguay, Panama). Even in countries like Mexico, with a strong tradition of secularism, Church influence is

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32 The Suharto regime’s recognition of warias resonates in many ways with the situation prevailing in Iran, where access to sex reassignment was authorized very early in time by Khomeini and today is applied as corrective therapy for sexual and gender variance and ambiguity, while homosexuality remains anathema and criminalized.
exercised informally, and Church authorities continue to play a powerful role in public life. In his overview paper on religion presented at the Latin American Regional Dialogue (included in Volume I), Juan Marco Vaggione recognized the long history of entanglement between religious and political authorities in the region, rendering laicization “partial or incomplete in most countries”.

But Vaggione also highlighted transformations in the Church’s engagement with politics today, noting the convergence of two phenomena that have reshaped its public presence. First, in the context of the processes of democratic reform that have swept the region since the 1980s, the Church has increased its role in public life. Influenced by doctrinal changes enacted at the Second Vatican Council, Church leaders have thus taken advantage of the new political space opened for participation, enjoying renewed legitimacy in many countries due to the stance taken by progressive sectors of the Church in pro-democracy movements. Second, this increased participation in public life has coincided with what Vaggione calls its “reactive politicization”, referring to the reorientation of its political priorities toward stopping or reversing the advances made by sexual rights movements in recent decades. This is a regional expression of a larger global trend. As the papacies of John Paul II and Benedict XVI made concerted efforts to weaken the most progressive sectors of the Church, the Vatican has created new institutions like the Pontifical Council for the Family and the Pontifical Academy for Life, putting its battle against the so-called “culture of death” at the top of its political agenda. The Church, of course, has claimed a privileged role in dictating sexual morality in Latin America since the inception of Iberian colonial projects. What makes its contemporary articulations different, as Vaggione notes, is the dual role it now seeks to play, both as a religious institution claiming a privileged status vis-à-vis other religions, based on these deep historic roots, and also as one among many actors in civil society claiming a legitimate role in democratic public debate. This bimodal engagement with politics has made countering its influence particularly difficult, and it is precisely in policies related to sexuality, Vaggione concludes, that this influence is greatest.

Two recent developments have further complicated this political terrain in complex and contradictory
ways. The widespread sex scandals that have overtaken the Church in the early twenty-first century have in some instances served to weaken its position and created potential opportunities for sexual rights advocacy. Yet the effects of the appointment of the first Latin American pope, Argentinian Pope Francis, who has adopted a more “tolerant” and benign tone on matters of sexuality while maintaining the Church’s long-held positions condemning homosexuality and abortion, remain to be seen.

Conservative rearticulations

A second common theme to emerge at all the dialogues was a focus on contemporary transformations of conservative religious activism. In this respect, Vaggione identified a “mimetic quality” in the organizational and discursive strategies adopted by conservative activists and sexual rights movements. In some instances, this strategic convergence represents a direct response to sexual rights advocacy (or an extension of the Church’s reactive politicization) and in others a response to common structural changes reshaping activism and politics writ large. Again, this phenomenon was most extensively addressed at the Latin American meeting, though the tendencies discussed there have a larger global dimension that became evident at the other meetings as well.

Discursively, Vaggione highlighted a shift evident in many countries in Latin America, where conservative activists have increasingly adopted discourses of human rights, natural law, and science to frame their political positions in secular and universalist terms. This shift from scriptural argumentation toward universalist language in part reflects changes within churches themselves, most notably, the Catholic Church’s embrace of freedom of conscience and human rights in its encyclical *Dignitatis Humanae*, issued at the Second Vatican Council, a move that implicitly “[abandoned Catholicism’s] compulsory character” (Casanova, 1994, p. 72). But as Vaggione suggested, the shift also reflects a “strategic secularism”, as activists have adapted to the hegemonic terms of political debate in order to open spaces that might otherwise be closed to them and to find greater
resonance in public opinion.

In his presentation at the Latin American Dialogue, for instance, the political scientist Jaris Mujica pointed to the work of CEPROFARENA (the Center for Promotion of the Family and the Regulation of Fertility), Human Life International’s affiliate in Peru, founded in 1981 and currently one of the most important conservative NGOs in the country. Once headed by former health minister Fernando Carbone, the organization has been particularly active in medical and public health circles, advancing a purportedly scientific discourse to support public policies defending the “traditional family” and restricting access to contraception. The Declaration of Lima, issued at the Second International Pro-Life Congress organized by CEPROFARENA in 2005, thus cited purportedly scientific evidence that life begins at conception in arguing that the human rights of the unborn should be protected. Needless to say, this secular turn in religious activism also poses a new dilemma for sexual rights activists in the region, whose most common response to conservative religious mobilization has been a stalwart defense of the secular state, arguably pointing both to the political successes of this strategy and to its possible limits, as we elaborate below.

Organizationally, like sexual rights advocates, conservative sectors have experienced a parallel process of NGOization and transnationalization, articulating linkages not only regionally but also with the Holy See and the religious right in the United States. Vida Humana Internacional, the Miami-based affiliate of Human Life International, for example, was founded in 1984 to articulate work among its affiliates in Latin America, the Caribbean, and Spain. In recent years, the organization has promoted the creation of the Latin American Network of Priests and Seminarians for Life and the Latin American Network of Women’s Support Centers, to increase regional coordination in efforts to restrict access to abortion.33 Reflecting a certain thematic specialization, as Mujica suggested

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in the Latin American Dialogue, the Latin American Alliance for Life (ALAFA), with headquarters in Caracas, Venezuela, has focused work on religious and sex education. The boundaries separating NGOs from formal church structures can be permeable. Both the founder of ALAFA, Cristina de Marcellus de Vollmer, and her husband, Alberto Vollmer Herrera, the former Venezuelan ambassador to the Holy See, for instance, are also lay members of the Vatican Pontifical Family Council (González Ruiz, 2005). What we see, then, is a reconfiguration of conservative religious activism in the region, operating primarily through NGOs and loosely coordinated transnational policy networks. As with sexual rights activism, this process of NGOization implies the embrace of an organizational form that enjoys legitimacy in national and international public spheres while facilitating access to funding. At the same time, national and transnational networks can bring together various types of organizations (i.e., churches of various denominations, NGOs, funders, legislative caucuses, and political parties) in ways that permit flexibility in mobilizing around campaigns or particular events as well as a certain functional and thematic specialization.

The discursive and organizational transformations that Vaggione and Mujica identified at the Latin American Dialogue have broader global dimensions. Since at least the Cairo Conference on Population and Development, global networks of religious leaders and activists began mobilizing to counter the advances advocates of sexual and reproductive rights have made in international circles, reflecting a “reactive politicization” unfolding at the global level. The Vatican, for example, has worked with the Organization of the Islamic Conference and NGOs associated with the religious right in the United States to block discussions at the United Nations addressing violence committed against individuals for their sexual orientation or gender expression.

Conservative activists have also established transnational spaces like the World Congress of Families to help consolidate a sort of “ecumenical conservatism” (Jones, Azparren, & Polishchuk, 2010). In doing so, they have also adopted discursive strategies that bracket particular religious dogmas that might spark conflict within these alliances, such as the emphasis placed on the nuclear family
as opposed to extended families as a universal model of the “natural family”. They have also embraced strategically secular frames that might find resonance across religious traditions and national contexts, including critiques of sexual rights as a neocolonial imposition emanating from the global North (Buss & Herman, 2003). In various African countries, US-based conservative Protestant Evangelical organizations have promoted the formation of local affiliates and transnational ties, thus “Africanizing the local leadership of their operations” while “leveling charges of neocolonialism against Western governments and international human rights groups” (Kaoma, 2012, p. iii).

In 2009 and 2010, for example, the American Center for Law and Justice opened two offices on the continent: the East African Center for Law and Justice in Kenya and the African Center for Law and Justice in Zimbabwe, with the aim of lobbying African parliaments “to take the Christian’s views into consideration as they draft legislation and policies” (Kaoma, 2013, p. vii). Such institutions have disseminated the language of US “culture wars” on the continent, advancing measures to tighten laws against homosexuality and recognize life from the moment of conception. At the continental level, these waves of US based Evangelism interweave with the local conservative voices of the Anglican Church — which for some years have threatened to sever ties with Canterbury because of its acceptance of LGBT identities and rights — as well as with dogmatic Catholic forces. These dynamics in combination with economic and geopolitical factors explain the recent adoption of draconian anti-homosexuality laws in Uganda and Nigeria that have led to mob attacks and incarceration of sexual dissidents (Petchesky, forthcoming).

One must, of course, keep in mind both the diversity within these alliances and the fact that not all religious activists belong to them or align with their goals. Even so, as a counterpoint to the transnational networks of sexual rights advocates, the emergence of these transnational articulations speaks to the formation of different global communities advancing competing normative visions of the sex–gender order and political projects to realize them. Such transnational networks, again, are marked by power asymmetries, and the political projects they advance have found variable
expression in different national contexts, a reflection of power dynamics playing out both within national polities and within these transnational networks themselves.

A good example of this phenomenon raised at both the African and Asian Regional Dialogues is the impact of the so-called “ABC strategy” (Abstain, Be Faithful, Use Condoms). Originating in the abstinence-only approach to sex education advocated by the religious right in the United States since the 1980s, the model was given considerable impetus globally through its incorporation into the President’s Emergency Plan for Aids Relief (PEPFAR). US President George W. Bush signed PEPFAR into law in 2003, committing $15 billion dollars to the global fight against AIDS. Advancing a fundamentally faith-based approach to AIDS prevention and sexual morality enforced through the “soft power” of funding conditionalities, PEPFAR used the same model as the “global gag rule” already applied by the administration to organizations that provide abortion services. In this version, PEPFAR regulations stipulated that US funds could not be used by any group that “does not have a policy explicitly opposing prostitution and sex trafficking” (Oliver, 2012). In 2006, the program mandated that 33 percent of all prevention funds and two-thirds of those directed to prevention of sexual transmission be directed to “abstinence or fidelity programs” (Oliver, 2012; Santelli, Speizer, & Edelstein, 2013).

In India, as Jayashree Ramakrishna noted at the Asian Regional Dialogue, the prohibitions instituted in PEPFAR resonated with conservative elements from various religious groups in Indian society, leading to a marginalization of condoms in public health strategies. As she observed: “Decisions taken by powerful countries do not remain confined to their programs but soon find their way into other international and national programs. NACO [the National AIDS Control Organisation] too

34 Evertz (2010) traces the roots of the ABC model to early efforts to curb teen pregnancy advanced by the religious right in the United States, finding an early expression in the Adolescent Family Life Act that was signed into law by President Ronald Reagan. That law called for “family-centered” programs that “promote chastity and self-discipline” (p. 7). See also Corrêa, Petchesky and Parker, 2008.
subscribed to this ideology and included this language in its policy and program documents”.

Finding resonance in the larger society, this relative marginalization of condoms found “little protest” outside of civil society organizations working in the areas of HIV and sexual health. Among the deleterious consequences of PEPFAR’s implementation in India was the destabilization of local HIV prevention efforts, particularly among organizations of sex workers. In its hugely problematic though not uncommon conflation of sex work with human trafficking, PEPFAR reinforced local “raid, rescue, and rehabilitation schemes” targeting sex worker organizations doing prevention work (Ahmed & Seshu, 2012, p. 150). Among the organizations targeted by such actions were Veshya Anyay Mukti Parishad (VAMP), a sex worker collective in Sangli, India, as well as its parent organization SANGRAM. In 2004, an attack launched on both organizations “under the guise of implementing the ‘prostitution pledge’ … was sanctioned by PEPFAR … illustrating how externally imposed neocolonial ‘laws’ could be used to echo the hangover of colonial forms of repression in the name of cultural/political ‘security’” (Ramasubban, 2007, p. 114).

In Nigeria as well, the implementation of PEPFAR has relied on articulations with local faith-based organizations (FBOs) and government officials. In 2004, over 30 FBOs and NGOs created the Nigerian Abstinence Coalition, an affiliate of the US-based Abstinence Clearinghouse, to advance projects promoting abstinence and fidelity. PEPFAR Nigeria encourages local FBOs to apply for funds and mobilizes religious leaders to incorporate abstinence-based prevention messages into sermons delivered at churches and mosques (Jappah, 2013). While the increased resources invested in combating HIV and AIDS have helped save lives, particularly in areas like mother-to-child transmission and blood screening (Jappah, 2013), the effectiveness of abstinence-focused prevention programs is highly questionable, in part because the approach fails to respond to the needs and realities experienced by many groups in society, particularly youth (Oliver, 2012; Santelli, Speizer, & Edelstein, 2013; Evertz, 2010). Adenike Esiet, from Action Health Incorporated (Nigeria), addressed some of these failures in her presentation at the African Regional Dialogue.
Esiet specifically highlighted the failure of what she called the “Don’ts Framework” to respond to the needs of Nigerian youth. Young people between the ages of 15 and 24, she noted, represent a significant percentage of new HIV cases in the country and account for over 60 percent of the complications from unsafe abortions (only legal in Nigeria when a pregnancy threatens the life of the woman). The Don’ts Framework, she argued, does not address larger structural factors like poverty linked to higher risk of infection; stereotypes adolescents as victims or villains without taking into account their real-life experience; and in particular, fails to acknowledge female sexual agency, in this regard reinforcing social norms that increase girls’ vulnerability to infection. Esiet concluded that what is crucially needed is a move toward a “pleasure framework” that could transcend the narrow focus on “risk” and in particular empower adolescent girls.

The promises and traps of laicité and secularism

Participants at the dialogues also addressed the question of secularism and its place in contemporary sexual politics. The issue was discussed extensively at the meeting in Latin America, where the defense of the principles of laicité has become a central strategy for sexual rights advocates across the region. Somewhat surprisingly, it was not raised at the other meetings. Its importance in Latin America, as Vaggione noted, is evidenced not only in national politics, but also in regional campaigns. At the World Social Forum in 2002, a coalition of feminist groups launched the Campaign against Fundamentalisms, People are Fundamental. Coordinated by the Marcosur Feminist Articulation of Uruguay, the campaign sought to disseminate a message repudiating both religious and market fundamentalisms. In 2006, a group of activists and academics from various countries launched the Ibero-American Network for Secular Liberties, an initiative that seeks to foster research on and promote the defense of “civil liberties, especially sexual and reproductive rights, within the
framework of benefits provided by the secular state”. This emphasis on the defense of laïcité, as it had been established after independence in the nineteenth century, is understandable in light of the disproportionate political influence exercised by the Catholic Church in most of the region and, in some countries, the political turn of a growing presence of Protestant evangelical churches.

Yet, this secularist strategy also poses certain dilemmas. In this regard, Vaggione underscored the need to move beyond the defense of the secular state or laïcité to develop a more complex understanding of religion, a call, as he noted, that finds resonance in the recent “post-secular turn” in social theory (Asad, 2003; Braidotti, 2008; Habermas, 2006, 2008). The growing critiques of secularism and laïcité developed in this body of work respond to recent global developments, in particular the instrumentalization of the banner of secularism (alongside the banners of liberal feminism, sexual rights, and human rights more generally) to justify a global “war on terror”. As many have argued, the War on Terror marshals thinly veiled racist policies directed against Muslim immigrant communities in various countries, particularly in Western Europe, once again raising questions about the universalist pretensions and promises of emancipation of discursive appeals to political liberalism. The sociologist Saadia Toor (2012) has called attention to a “palpable disease with Islam within the liberal mainstream and portions of the Left,” informed by Orientalist and Islamophobic ideologies that stereotype Islam as “uniquely misogynist and homophobic … the result of the essential illiberalism of a religion that has never undergone a ‘Reformation’”. (p. 1) As Vaggione noted, the deployment of secular frames to target Muslim communities “reveals the ethnocentric biases underlying these normative models”. More generally, he suggested that the stalwart defense of secularism or laïcité runs the risk of essentializing religion overall as fundamentally backward and something to be overcome on the path to a universal modernity. Recalling the parallel inscription of religion and sexuality in the private sphere by liberal philosophers, Vaggione noted a certain irony in

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the fact that “movements, whose central aim was to dismantle the dichotomy between public and private, have in these debates, reinscribed the closet of the private sphere as the proper place of religion”. (Vaggione, 2013, 154)

This critical interrogation of a discourse so central to sexual rights advocates’ response to conservative religious activism elicited quite heated discussion at the Latin American Regional Dialogue. Certainly, there are moments when activists’ arguments reproduce the most problematic aspects of modernist narratives, as when one Brazilian gay activist called on lawmakers to emulate the “civilized countries of the First World” during congressional testimony on a bill recognizing same-sex unions (de la Dehesa, 2010, p. 134). At the same time, one might question whether a critique that developed largely within the US and European academies to challenge US military expansionism and to challenge racist attacks on immigrant communities in Western Europe can be applied in the same way in contexts where the banner of the secular state or of principles of laïcité is primarily deployed to challenge one of the most powerful institutions in national and regional politics. Just as it is not the same for the United States government to deploy the discourse of human rights to justify military invasions as it is for a local organization to use the same discourse to stop a campaign of police abuse.

In his presentation at the Latin American Regional Dialogue, Fernando Seffner of the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (Brazil) raised the need for contextual sensitivity in such critiques. While recognizing that his own naturalized assumptions regarding the defense of secularity and laïcité have changed over the years, Seffner stipulated that this does not mean that his earlier thinking was “wrong” or “a mistake”. Rather, he argued this shift reflected a contextually specific imperative at a given moment in time, precisely to respond to the Church’s central role delimiting the boundaries of public debate. While recognizing that “these are different times”, Seffner nonetheless suggested that there are specific situations when the defense of laïcité has a place in politics, citing the example of Brazilian lawmakers who place their hands on the Bible during legislative
debate, declaring it to be “my constitution and the true constitution of Brazil”. In such moments, Seffner argued, “calling on people not to base their decision on religious values is not a mistake”. Similarly, in his comments on Vaggione’s paper, Luis Antonio Cunha, coordinator of the Observatory on State Laicité at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (Brazil), drew a useful distinction between the secularization of society and the laicization of the state, suggesting that, while dialogue with religious organizations and people of faith is undoubtedly important, a line should be drawn when it comes to the uses of scripture as the basis of law and public policy; maintaining this line remains crucial in Latin American polities. All of this said, Seffner recognized that such critiques have denaturalized the discourse of secularism in productive ways, shedding light on how projects of secularization (or laicization) come in many forms, all of which — like religions — presuppose a moral vision that we can and must interrogate.

Beyond his normative critiques of the defense of secularism and laicité as deployed by sexual rights activists, Vaggione also raised important arguments concerning other limitations of this political strategy. First, he suggested that this strategy fails to take into account the “strategic secularism” currently embraced by religious activists and authorities. Again, if on the one hand this shift in conservative discourse can be regarded as a success of activists’ defense of secularism in the past, it now presents the need to develop new responses to the shifting discursive terrain of political debate. Secondly and perhaps more importantly, Vaggione situated a critique of this strategy within a broader critique of the state-centered focus of sexual rights movements. For sexual rights to become a reality, he argued, broader and deeper cultural transformations are needed that go beyond formal changes in law and public policy.

Again noting that the defense of secularity or laicité, in some of its deployments, runs the risk of alienating large sectors of the population or labeling people of faith as backward, Vaggione was emphatic that the realization of sexual rights as a daily practice “[requires] a cultural transformation that would permit overcoming notions of guilt and sin with respect to sexuality”. To this end, he
proposed an alternative strategy based on the recognition of and articulation with religious actors who may be supportive of sexual and reproductive rights and even sexual pleasure. This reasoning strongly resonates with the vision developed by Corrêa, Petchesky & Parker (2008) in relation to a politics of the body and its integrity, freedom, social connectedness, and pleasures that may:

…prepare the ground for working coalitions and solidarity across many diverse activist groups — whether feminist, lesbian, gay, transgender, queer, intersex, sex workers, and people living with HIV, or groups mobilized against torture, militarism, racism, and ethnic violence and those for health care, reproductive justice, comprehensive sex education, food security, and disability rights. (Corrêa, Petchesky, & Parker, 2008, p. 233)
The wealth of information, analyses and insights that emerged in the course of the four Dialogues on Sexuality and Geopolitics sponsored by Sexuality Policy Watch between 2009 and 2011 responds only partially to the challenges and concerns raised by participants in relation to the state of the art of sexuality research and the future of the sexual rights agenda. The rich conversations that unfolded at the regional meetings speak to the ongoing salience of the conceptual framework initially devised to guide them. While approached with different emphases and inflections at each meeting and without discounting significant differences in the actors involved in different contexts, the discussions confirmed conclusions reached in earlier global research projects organized by SPW: that the intersections between sexualities and the state, economics, religion and science comprise the political frontlines of contemporary sexual politics. Above all, in the context of rapid flux produced by fast capitalism, rapid technological innovations, proliferating religious revivalisms and new, proverbially “flexible” technologies of governmentality, participants highlighted the emerging challenges and risks posed for researchers and activists by the contemporary global juncture.

Key among them is a series of transformations in technologies of governmentality of growing importance in recent decades, which have decentered the state as the privileged arena for the formulation and implementation of policy. Non-governmental and community based organizations in particular have been incorporated into technologies of government through public–private partnerships and policy networks encompassing local, national and international actors. This shift
appears to respond ambiguously both to new left calls for societal participation and civic inclusion and to new right calls for reduced budgets and a retrenchment of the state (Altman, 1994). It becomes instantiated through various modalities, including funding conditionalities and more informal guidelines issued by various actors as well as multilateral policy agreements ranging from the Cairo Program of Action to statements of international foundations and the World Bank (Altman, 1994; de la Dehesa & Mukherjee, 2012; Montecinos, 2001; Bedford, 2009). For activists and social movements, many of which entered the political arena with a more oppositional stance toward the state, the possibility of cooperation poses new dilemmas, including the risk of economic and political dependence and complicity in neoliberal governance.

More and more, public policies are being designed and implemented through policy networks articulating multiple actors in ways that decenter, without necessarily displacing, state institutions. Such networks may include government agencies at the federal and local levels, international agencies, academic institutions, private enterprise (such as pharmaceutical companies), and NGOs. While such networks often purport to embody ideals of horizontality and deliberation, they are by no means free of power asymmetries (Chalmers, Martin, & Piester, 1997). Dynamics of power condition not only relations among actors in networks (among NGOs of varying capacities and between NGOs and other institutions with which they are articulated) but also mechanisms of selection permitting access to networks in the first place (from formal membership requirements to informal imperatives such as the ability to speak English or finance travel). The implications of these transformations for sexual rights advocacy emerged as a central area of concern at all the dialogues, though again, with different emphases and inflections across the regions and countries.

At the Latin American Regional Dialogue, Pecheny and de la Dehesa underscored the central contradiction experienced in the region with the emergence of neoliberal democracies. If transitions to formal democracy have opened spaces for dialogue (albeit to varying degrees), promising a more inclusive politics, these changes coincided with the debt crisis of the 1980s and subsequent
adoption of neoliberal structural adjustment programs, which have magnified economic polarization and reinforced various forms of social exclusion. Moreover, the incorporation of activists into policy networks on the basis of their expertise on populations — for example, on the so-called MARPs (most-at-risk populations for contracting HIV) — has contributed significantly to the NGOization and medicalization of sexual rights activism in the region. The problem of medicalization, as noted above, was raised as a central point of discussion at the African and Asian Dialogues as well, underscoring the powerful influence of broader global dynamics at play.

NGOs can play an important role in advocacy, research, and service provision. As brokers of information, they translate medical, legal and other forms of expert knowledge into everyday language accessible to the populations they serve while providing other professional “stakeholders” with information about the issues and populations they represent. They play an increasingly important new role in governance, in part compensating for the gaps and limitations of state action in the contemporary context of neoliberal globalization. However, NGOs are not themselves democratic in their organization and indeed operate within networks that valorize (presumably apolitical) technical capacities. Their growing importance in civil societies thus raises new questions about representation and accountability, questions that, coupled with competition for access and funding, have at times fostered divisions within sexual rights movements themselves (Clark, 2003; Ramos, 2004; Câmara da Silva, 2008; Alvarez, Dagnino & Escobar, 1997).

Certainly, the internationalization of policy-making and the decentering of decision-making implied by this reconfiguration of governance have created opportunities for activists to exert political pressure through alternative channels when state doorways are closed to them. Yet in the context of emerging democracies traversed by neoliberal technologies of governmentality, they are also prone to technocratic policymaking and can undermine mechanisms of democratic accountability (Montecinos, 2001). Thus, as Elsa Muñiz observed in her presentation, when the state was presumably responsible for the health of national populations, there was “at least an identifiable
face”. But with the advent of what she termed “schizophrenic neoliberal states” — which speak the language of rights but do otherwise in policy terms — this responsibility has been diffused across a multiplicity of actors, and the pathways to the effective appropriation of rights are not always clear.

This administrative reconfiguration of governmentality in part maps onto territorial shifts in the nature of government. Often the very actors touting respect for democratic citizenship and universal human rights are the ones promoting the creation of secret prisons, refugee camps, export processing zones, and migrant worker compounds — sovereign “states of exception” where such norms are routinely suspended (Agamben, 2005). This is occurring even as in other spaces a lack of state capacity or political will has left vacuums to be filled by other actors, from military insurgencies to religious organizations and NGOs (O’Donnell, 1996, 1999). Both dynamics result in the unevenly effective presence of the state and a variable territorialization of government, marking further limits to the formal recognition of sexual and reproductive rights and human rights more generally.

The deliberate construction of sovereign states of exception as parallel regimes of government where the norms of citizenship, including sexual and reproductive rights, are formally suspended was addressed most explicitly at the Asian Regional Dialogue, primarily in relation to the governance of international migration, as we discussed above. Yet notably, participants focused as much if not more attention on the kinds of “states of exception” that are often not recognized as such. Unlike the formulation advanced by the Italian philosopher, Giorgio Agamben (2005), which presupposes a totalizing sovereignty and a very effective state presence (as suggested by his metaphor of the concentration camp, a total institution, as a reflection of a contemporary politics in which the exception has become the rule), participants gave greater emphasis to the vacuums left by weak or absent states. The implications of weak state capacity in relation to globalized sexual rights advocacy were, again, raised at the Africa Dialogue by Sybille Nyeck. In contexts where their networks are supplanting state structures that are financially and politically weak, she argued, NGOs run the risk of advancing donor-driven policies in a top-down manner in ways that can reinforce perceptions
that they are complicit in neocolonial projects and undercut real bases of societal support.

At its extreme, however, the implications of an absent state were most vividly illustrated in a presentation at the Latin American Dialogue by the demographer, Gabriel Gallego Montes, from the University of Caldas in Colombia. Once again underscoring the slippage between law and practice, Gallego highlighted, on the one hand, the notable advances made in recent years in the formal recognition of rights for LGBT people through the national legislature, the Supreme Court, various municipal governments, and even police forces. Yet Gallego situated the limits of these formal rights in the context of the country’s decades-old armed conflict. In Colombia, he argued, “the state is not the only key actor in the regulation of sexuality, which also includes the active participation of the insurgent Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC) as well as paramilitary groups”. Gallego recalled, in this context, the long and ignominious history of “social cleansing” in the country, involving campaigns of social control advanced by these parallel powers, often with the secret complicity of police forces and sectors of the state, aimed at the extermination of travestis, sex workers, effeminate men, homeless people, and other socially marginalized sectors. Contrasting the hell of lived experience with the heaven of formal law, Gallego cited a flyer distributed by a paramilitary organization, announcing a campaign of social cleansing, establishing a curfew in the territory they controlled, and threatening the assassination of drug-users, prostitutes and people with AIDS. As Rosalind Petchesky observed at the Interregional Dialogue, the dilemmas posed, on the one hand, by the rise of security states in the context of the war on terror and politically instituted regimes of exception; and on the other, by areas where weak or absent states leave vacuums filled by other actors, require that sexual rights advocates undertake a careful mapping of needs across territories related to the continuum of strength and fragility across the world of states.

The challenges are daunting. Compounding them is the widespread legitimation crisis confronting political institutions in many countries, which in some cases have extended to NGOs, partly as a byproduct of their incorporation into frameworks of governance (Habermas, 1988) and the
desertification of liberal democratic politics (Zizek, 2002). Critical views that explore the death of queer theorizing (Ahmed, 2010; Berlant & Warner, 1995; Edelman, 2006; Freeman, 2010) are also to be named as they interrogate the power of contemporary critical theories of gender and sexuality to dislodge the geological layers of hetero-procreative pacts. In the words of O'Rourke (2011), our (impossible) task is “to bring about utopian futures from within a negating and seemingly hopeless present” (p. 1).

Yet the life worlds that motivated our critical reflections in these publications have not vanished but are still out there pulsating. Between 2011 and 2013, while the substance of the SPW dialogues was being processed, novel expressions of civic action and political mobilization swept across geographic boundaries, finding expression in the Arab Spring, Spain’s Indignados and similar protests elsewhere in Europe, Occupy Wall Street, and the so-called 2013 June Journeys in Brazil. Writing about the deep paradoxes of our times, Khanna et al. (2013) elaborate on the extraordinariness of this string of events as new instances of mass politics that escape the conventional forms of interest-group and identity politics as well as the abstract deliberative politics sometimes posited by critical theorists. In the authors’ view, the 2011–2013 rebellions call for a revitalization of the political imagination unconstrained by cynicism or necessary recourse to formal political mechanisms. This would allow us to claim a vision of justice that transcends the limited fictions (however politically expedient) of representation and totalizing identities.

Such a reimagining of sexual politics, however, requires a critical interrogation of three binary traps that still hobble our movements. One involves the deepening rift between erotic justice and social justice, which derives from epistemologies that continue to extract intimate and bodily experience from broader social contexts. As Corrêa, Petchesky and Parker (2008) have observed:

Treating sexuality as something separate from political economy ignores the fact that health care access, affordable housing, adequate nutrition, safe environments, and secure
livelihoods are indispensable for safe and pleasurable erotic experience to be real. This false dichotomy not only obscures the necessary enabling conditions for sexual rights across lines of gender, class, race, ethnicity, and geography. It also disregards the *materiality* of sexual expression and well-being, a materiality rooted, not in some essential biological drive or genetic predisposition, but rather in the ways that bodies ‘matter’ and become materialized through the same regulatory norms and power relations that produce gender, class, race, ethnicity, and geography to begin with. If bodies themselves — genes, hormones, sexual and reproductive organs — are always imbued with, and made intelligible through, norms and practices, the cultural and economic/political dimensions of those norms are also closely intertwined and this makes it all the more urgent that advocacy for erotic justice and advocacy for economic justice be similarly bound together. (Corrêa, Petchesky and Parker, 2008, p. 220)

Equally important is the need to address the artificial separation between religion and politics that conceals the interpenetration of these two domains of social and personal life, an interpenetration that assumes quite distinctive forms in different socio-historical contexts. Today and possibly for the foreseeable future, feminist and sexual rights activists and intellectuals working in these fields confront the challenge of re-engaging with religion without ‘returning’ there. Such a critical engagement means contesting systematic injustices and violations perpetrated in the name of religion, regardless of the doctrinal tradition that may be used to justify them. But it also implies breaking through doorways that dogmatic or defensive secular tenets may have closed, for instance, by reexamining the spiritual, ecstatic, and mystical dimensions of sexuality, or by forging alliances with faith-based groups where we share common goals and values.

Finally, a sexual politics informed by the premises of social justice must systematically argue for a vision encompassing *both* singularity and interdependence (of bodies, persons, desires), and thus reexamine the binary divisions between individual and community. By insisting on the singularity of
bodies and persons we recognize the indeterminacy and infinite variation of desire, relationships and social ties. Within such a frame, economic and social rights accruing to communities are ultimately about the individual bodies — the bare life — that need these resources to live. A project aiming at the ongoing reconceptualization of individual claims within the shifting matrices of communities and wider social relationships also requires a critical rethinking of identity politics. The challenge in this case is how to weave meaningful and politically viable linkages across a wide range of identity-based groups without erasing the real social differences among them or returning to the empty and historically contaminated (and anthropocentric) abstraction of ‘humanity as a whole’. Sexual politics, in the past as in the present, is about (re)linking bodies with communities and erotic justice with social justice. The inhospitable landscapes discussed above make this project ever more pressing.


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